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A PRICE-SENSITIVE QUANTITY-FLEXIBLE SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACT 
MODEL AS A SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE DRIVER 
SUMMARY 
A supply chain consists of all stages involved, directly or indirectly, in fulfilling a 
customer request. The objective of every supply chain is to maximize the overall 
value generated. The value a supply chain generates is the difference between what 
the final product is worth to the customer and the effort the supply chain expends in 
filling the customer’s request. For most commercial supply chains, this value will be 
strongly correlated with supply chain profitability, the difference between the 
revenue generated from the customer and the overall cost across the supply chain. 
The objective of maximizing this supply chain surplus can be achieved by improving 
the supply chain performance in terms of efficiency and responsiveness using the 
four supply chain drivers: inventory, transportation, facilities, and information. 
In this dissertation, we discussed these four drivers and introduced supply chain 
contracts as another driver to maximize supply chain profitability. Of particular 
interest here are contracts that specify the parameters within which a buyer places 
orders and a supplier fulfills them in order to maximize the total supply chain 
surplus.  
We discussed two supply chain contract models.  First, where a retailer facing price 
sensitive demand may obtain a discount by committing a fixed quantity over a finite 
horizon, and second where a manufacturer offering buyback or quantity flexibility 
contracts may increase the total supply chain profit.  
We concluded that the first model incorporates demand as a function of the selling 
price but does not address the crucial issue of total supply chain surplus 
maximization. On the other hand, the second model, although it increases the total 
supply chain surplus, does not incorporate the demand elasticity.  
We then developed a model to address the individual weaknesses of the models 
discussed by incorporating the price sensitive demand into quantity flexibility 
contracts by determining the optimal level of product availability, as a function of the 
  xii 
selling price, which maximizes the total supply chain profit. We also proposed two 
solutions to the issue of profit sharing related to the distribution of the additional 
supply chain profit generated by using the contracts. We then showed, through 
numerical experiments, that our model maximizes total supply chain surplus by 
incorporating demand elasticity and profit sharing into quantity flexibility contracts.  
It is our belief that the supply chain contract model developed in this dissertation can 
be an integral part of any Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) system. 
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FİYATA DUYARLI VE MİKTAR ESNEKLİĞİ OLAN BİR TEDARİK ZİNCİRİ 
SÖZLEŞMESİ MODELİNİN TEDARİK ZİNCİRİ PERFORMANS GELİŞTİRİCİSİ 
OLARAK KULLANIMI 
ÖZET 
Tedarik zinciri, bir ürünün tasarım aşamasından son müşterinin eline ulaşıncaya 
kadar geçireceği ve gerekli olan tüm aşamaları kapsar. Her tedarik zincirinin amacı 
kattığı değeri en üst düzeye çıkartmaktır. Bu değer tüketiciye ulaşan en son ürünün 
getirisiyle tedarik zincirinin bu ürünü müşteriye ulaştırıncaya kadar harcadığı tüm 
emeklerin arasındaki farktır. Genelde bütün ticari tedarik zincirlerinde bu katma 
değer, tedarik zincirinin tüketiciden elde ettiği getiri ile ürünün toplam maliyeti 
arasındaki farka eşittir. Bu katma değeri en üst düzeye çıkartma amacı tedarik 
zincirinin etkinliğini arttırmakla, diğer bir deyişle, en az masraf ile tüketici 
beklentilerini en üst düzeyde karşılamakla sağlanır. Bunun için de tedarik zincirinin 
bilinen dört performans geliştiricisi: stok, nakliyat, tesisler, ve bilgi sistemleri 
kullanılır.    
Çalışmamızda, yukarıdaki dört performans geliştiricisi bu yönden incelenmiş ve 
tedarik zinciri sözleşmelerinin bir diğer performans geliştiricisi olarak nasıl tedarik 
zinciri katma değerini en üst düzeye çıkartmada kullanılabileceği araştırılmıştır. 
Özellikle, tedarik zinciri içindeki bir üretici ve satıcı arasında tedarik zinciri katma 
değerini en üst düzeye çıkaran fiyat ve miktarları belirleyen sözleşmeler 
incelenmiştir.  
İki tedarik zinciri sözleşmesi modeli incelenmiştir. İlk sözleşme tipi olarak, ürüne olan 
talebin satış fiyatı ile bağlantılı olduğu bir ortamda, üreticinin satıcıya belli bir 
miktarda ürün alma garantisi karşılığı önerdiği indirimler incelenmiştir. İkinci 
sözleşme tipi olarak ise, üreticinin toplam tedarik zinciri katma değerini arttırmak için 
satıcıya önerdiği satılamayan ürünü geri alma veya satın almada miktar esnekliği 
sağlama sözleşmeleri ele alınmıştır. 
Birinci modelde, görüleceği üzere, her ne kadar talep satış fiyatı ile bağlantılı ise de, 
sonuç yalnız satıcı açısından değerlendirildiğinden, modelin tedarik zinciri toplam 
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katma değeri üzerindeki etkisi belirsizdir. Diğer yandan, ikinci model tedarik 
zincirinin toplam katma değerini arttırdığı halde, talebin fiyat duyarlılığı göz önüne 
alınmamıştır. 
Çalışmamızda, bu modellerin zayıf noktalarına cevap veren ve talebin fiyata duyarlı 
olduğu bir ortamda üretici-satıcı arasında miktar esnekliği sağlayarak tedarik zinciri 
katma değerini en üst düzeye çıkaran bir model geliştirdik ve sözleşmeden 
kaynaklanan bu ek katma değer artışının her iki tarafın da kazanması için nasıl 
paylaştırılabileceğini gösteren iki yöntem belirledik. Ayrıca, geliştirdiğimiz fiyata 
duyarlı olan ve ek katma değer artışının paylaşımını sağlayan miktar esnekliği 
modelinin tedarik zinciri katma değerini en üst düzeye çıkarardığını sayısal 
örneklerle gösterdik. 
İnancımız, bu çalışmada geliştirilen tedarik zinciri sözleşme modellerinin bütün APS 
(Advanced Planning and Scheduling / İleri Planlama ve Çizelgeleme) sistemlerinde 
kullanılabileceğidir. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
APICS, The Educational Society for Resource Management, dictionary defines the 
term supply chain as the processes from the initial raw materials to the ultimate 
consumption of the finished product linking across supplier-user companies [1, p: 3]. 
A supply chain consists of all stages involved, directly or indirectly, in fulfilling a 
customer request. Over the last three decades, information technology resources, 
such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the Internet, Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP), and Supply Chain Management (SCM) software have reshaped 
how firms manage the production and distribution of goods and services by sharing 
and analyzing the information in the supply chain. Competitive pressures have 
forced the companies to streamline supply chain operations to increase their 
efficiency while improving their responsiveness. 
The supply chain performance in terms of efficiency and responsiveness can be 
improved using the four supply chain drivers: inventory, transportation, facilities, and 
information [2, p: 50]. The supply chain not only includes the manufacturer and 
suppliers, but also transporters, warehouses, retailers, and customers themselves. 
The forecast of future customer demand and its unavoidable variability form the 
basis for all strategic and planning decisions in a supply chain in terms of production 
and distribution. 
In this dissertation, we present a series of models to redistribute the absorption of 
variability using contracts and show that effective use of contracts as a supply chain 
driver can substantially increase the overall supply chain profitability and its 
competitive advantage by forcing companies to evaluate every action in the context 
of the entire supply chain. A company’s partners in the supply chain may well 
determine the company’s success, as the company is intimately tied to its supply 
chain partners. This broad intercompany scope increases the size of the surplus to 
be shared among all stages of the supply chain.  
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1.1  Supply Chain Contracts and Committed Delivery Strategies 
A contract specifies the parameters within which a buyer places orders and a 
supplier fulfills them. It may contain specifications regarding quantity, price, time, 
and quality. At one extreme, a contract may require the buyer to specify the precise 
quantity required, with a very long lead time. In this case, the buyer bears the risk of 
overstocking and understocking, and the supplier has exact order information well 
advance of delivery. At the other extreme, buyers may not be required to commit to 
the precise purchase quantity until they are certain of their demand, with the supply 
arriving with a short lead time. In this case, the supplier has little advance 
information, and the buyer can wait until demand is known before ordering. As a 
result, the supplier must build inventory in advance and bear most of the risk of 
overstocking and understocking. As contracts change, the risk different stages of the 
supply chain bear changes, which affects the retailer’s and supplier’s decisions and 
the supply chain profitability. 
In this dissertation, we will analyze three specific types of contracts: 
• Committed deliveries where by committing to periodic deliveries of a specific 
quantity, a retailer facing price-sensitive demand absorbs some of the 
supply chain variability in exchange of a discount on committed deliveries. 
• Buyback contracts where the manufacturer specifies a wholesale price 
along with a buyback price at which the retailer can return any unsold units. 
• Quantity flexibility contracts where the manufacturer allows the retailer to 
change the quantity ordered after observing demand. 
1.2  Overview 
This dissertation examines several supply chain contracts. In Chapter 2, we review 
relevant literature. In Chapter 3, we look at various supply chain stages, decision 
phases, cycles, and supply chain implementation with the objective of maximizing 
the overall value generated by the supply chain. In Chapter 4, we review the supply 
chain performance in terms of a strategic fit to match supply chain’s responsiveness 
with demand uncertainty along with major demand patterns, and the need of an 
Intercompany Interfunctional scope to maximize total supply chain surplus. We also 
look at various supply chain drivers to achieve the balance between efficiency and 
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responsiveness, and obstacles to achieve this strategic fit as well as the implications 
of supply chain management in agile manufacturing.  
In Chapter 5, we look at the impact of information technology structure upon the 
development and rapid expansion of supply chain collaboration as we review 
various enterprise execution systems. Particularly, In Section 5.3 we look at how 
Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) systems seek to integrate information 
and coordinate overall supply chain decisions while recognizing the dynamics 
between functions and processes. In a sense, supply chain contracts we developed 
also seek the same objective while recognizing the dynamics between supply chain 
partners. Using Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) 
processes, the necessary coordination can be achieved. 
In Chapter 6, we present various contract models and then develop our own model. 
Sections 6.1 and Section 6.2 describe Retailer Profit without and with Commitment 
Opportunity, respectively, with Demand as a Function of the Selling Price. The 
strength of the model is the inclusion of demand as a function of the selling price. 
However, the model is restricted with the intracompany scope maximizing only the 
retailer’s profit without taking into account the total supply chain profit. The same is 
true for Retailer Profit without Commitment Opportunity with Normally Distributed 
Demand described in Section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 addresses the weakness of intracompany approach by introducing the 
total supply chain surplus with the intercompany view, which requires that both the 
manufacturer and the retailer evaluate their actions in the context of the entire 
supply chain. Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 describe how to maximize the total supply 
chain surplus using Buyback Contracts and Quantity Flexibility Contracts, 
respectively, with Normally Distributed Demand. Both buyback and quantity flexibility 
contracts help maximize the total supply chain profit. However, there are two issues 
that need to be addressed. The first one is related to profit sharing, i.e., how to 
share the additional supply chain surplus thus generated. The second issue, the 
main weakness of the contracts discussed, is the fact that demand has not been 
correlated to the selling price. 
In Chapter 7, we introduce our proposed model. First, in Section 7.1, we analyze 
and then evaluate two solutions to address the issue of profit sharing for quantity 
flexibility contracts. Then in Section 7.2, we develop a model to address the 
individual weaknesses of the models discussed by incorporating the price-sensitive 
demand into quantity flexibility contracts to maximize the total supply chain profit: 
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Committed Deliveries using Quantity Flexibility Contracts to Maximize Supply Chain 
Surplus with Demand as a Function of the Selling Price. In Section 7.3, we develop 
a computer program to help simulate the system to find optimum contract 
parameters. Finally, in Section 7.4, we compare the models and emphasize the 
benefits of using supply chain contracts with a price-sensitive demand function and 
profit sharing.   
In Chapter 8, we summarize our findings and discuss areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been much research addressing coordination among stages in the supply 
chain [3]. The literature covering supply chain management is vast and well 
developed. However, In spite of their prevalence in industry over the last thirty 
years, little has appeared in Operations Research or Management Science literature 
discussing supply chain contracts. Historically, the business literature has extolled 
the virtues of using multiple suppliers as a means of improving negotiating position.  
Heide [4] provides a review of existing theories of relationship management from a 
marketing channel perspective. Ellinger [5] and Hagy [6] emphasize the importance 
of integration and point to the need of a strong and significant relationship within the 
supply chain. 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin [7] set forth a theory that stronger interorganizational 
ties result in greater adaptive capabilities, thus firms with closer ties are better able 
to react to variability. Buvik and John [8] expand this theory to include the 
implications of asset specificity. Cashon and Fisher [9] support the notion of all 
players working as a unit focused on the requirements of product development and 
the value of shared information. 
Chandra and Kumar [10] analyze various issues important to supply chain 
management and provide broader awareness of supply chain principles and 
concepts. Balloe, Gilbert, and Mukherjee [11] discuss the new managerial 
challenges from supply chain opportunities. Motwani, Larsin, and Ahuja [12] present 
a survey of the global supply chain management (GSCM) literature with specific 
emphasis on the application of the process, services and products used by 
organizations to achieve competitive advantage and market position. 
Fox, Chionglo, and Barbuceanu [13] describe the goals and architecture of the 
Integrated Supply Chain Management System (ISCM). They consider the supply 
chain as a system which can be managed by a set of intelligent software agents, 
each responsible for one or more activities in the supply chain, and each interacting 
with other agents in the planning and execution of their responsibilities. 
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Sengupta and Turnbull [14] review the general ideas of supply chain, the key point 
being to keep all units synchronized and to solve the entire business problem by 
manoeuvring through upstream and downstream information. Success of the supply 
chain depends on several primary factors, including early visibility to changes in 
demand all along the supply chain and a single set of plans that drives the supply 
chain and integrates information. 
Humphreys, Shiu, and Chan [15] present the initial findings from the responses of 
large companies in Hong Kong and show the trend in supply chain relationships 
moving towards a more collaborative approach. Tracey and Tan [16] discuss a 
confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis to examine empirically the 
relationships among supply chain partners, and Masella and Rangone [17] propose 
different vendor selection systems based on the cooperative relationships. Liu, Ding, 
and Lall [18] demonstrate an application of data envelopment analysis in evaluating 
the relationships on the overall performance of suppliers in a manufacturing firm. 
Weber, Current, and Desai [19] present a similar approach using data envelopment 
analysis and multi objective programming.  
Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh [20] provide several approaches to define supply chain 
and its complexity. Trent and Monczka [21] discuss the complexity of external 
organizational systems and difficulties in fostering close partnerships and integration 
across the supply chain.  Milgate [22] presents a conceptual model to identify basic 
dimensions of the complexity involved. Spina and Zotteri [23] explore strategic and 
structural contingencies surrounding partnerships in a global survey and analyze 
collaborative practices along the operations integration and co-design dimensions. 
Anupindi and Akella [24] develop optimal ordering policies for a single buyer with 
multiple vendors. They present an optimal ordering policy that orders nothing when 
the inventory level is above an upper bound, orders from one vendor when the 
inventory level is between bounds, and orders from both vendors when the inventory 
level is below the lower bound. 
Kohli and Park [25] investigate joint ordering policies as a method to reduce costs 
between a single vendor and a group of buyers. They present expressions for 
optimal joint order quantities assuming all products are ordered in each joint order. 
Their model calculates the savings in fixed order costs, but does not explicitly model 
transportation costs. Furthermore, the requirement that every product is included in 
each order is limiting. 
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He et. al. [26] examine the effect of order crossing in a system with stochastic lead 
times. They show that the common single cycle analysis approach overestimates 
both cost and optimal order quantity. 
Weng [27-29] addresses a two-echelon, infinite horizon model with quantity 
discounts and price-sensitive demand. His work focuses on using quantity discount 
schedules as a mechanism for channel coordination. Rau, Wu, and Wee [30] 
present an integrated inventory model under a multi-echelon supply chain 
environment.  
Building on a work of Ernst and Pyke [31] and Yano and Gerchak [32], Henig et. al. 
[33] study a two-echelon system where a discount is offered for transportation 
capacity commitment. For an infinite horizon, stationary demand system, they show 
that for a given level of contracted transportation capacity, the optimal ordering 
policy is characterized by two critical numbers such that when on-hand inventory 
falls within a certain range, exactly the contracted capacity is used. 
Bassok and Anupindi [34] develop optimal inventory policies for a firm that has 
made a quantity commitment over some finite horizon. In their model, the 
committing firm is free to order any quantity in any period, as long as the total 
contracted quantity is purchased by the end of the horizon.   
Anupindi and Bassok [35] develop approximations for an inventory system with 
multiple items and a discount for a total volume commitment. The supplier extends 
the discount to a certain fraction above the commitment level. In numerical studies, 
they observe that increased demand variability leads to increased commitment, and 
increased flexibility offered by the supplier leads to decreased commitment.  
Bassok et. al. [36] study a finite horizon, stochastic demand inventory system with a 
supply contract frequently used in the electronic component industry. The contract 
requires the buyer to commit to order quantities in each of T periods. In the current 
period, the buyer must order a quantity within a fixed percentage α of the committed 
quantity. The buyer may also update future period commitments within a fixed 
percentage β. 
Eppen and Iyer [37, 38] examine a two-stage stochastic inventory model. Their 
model is motivated by backup agreements common to the fashion industry. Under 
such an agreement, a buyer chooses an order quantity, and the vendor holds back a 
fraction of the commitment. After observing initial demand, the buyer can acquire up 
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to the remainder of their commitment at the original price, paying a penalty cost for 
committed units not purchased. 
Tsay [39] models a manufacturer-retailer chain where the retailer gives a point 
estimate of demand. The two parties then agree on a minimum purchase 
commitment, a maximum quantity guaranteed to be available, and a transfer price. 
He shows that without such contract structure, inefficiencies may result. 
Vargas and Metters [40] present a dual-buffer approach designed to improve the 
cost and fill rate performance of a production system. They apply basic lot-sizing 
techniques to demand forecasts and use stochastic inventory theory to set safety 
stock levels. Their approach attempts to avoid scheduling a replenishment order 
merely to replenish safety stock.  
Smith and Zhang [41] study infinite horizon production planning with convex 
production and inventory costs and time varying, deterministic demand. They show 
that the optimal production levels for the infinite horizon problem can be obtained by 
solving a series of finite horizon problems. They also derive expressions for the 
minimum horizon length.  
DeCroix and Arreola-Risa [42] examine an inventory system where the likelihood 
that demand is lost rather than backlogged can be influenced by an economic 
incentive. They assume a backorder response function to describe the probability 
that customers will agree to backorder as a function of a monetary incentive offered. 
Optimal control parameters and backorder incentives can be found efficiently when 
the decision to offer the incentive can be made when a shortage occurs. 
Glasserman and Tayur [43] present a computational method for estimating inventory 
cost sensitivity with respect to centralized system parameters for a capacitated 
serial inventory system. Lee and Whang [44] reconsidered the same serial inventory 
system where operational decisions are made locally. The incentive scheme 
proposed requires all stages to share both demand distribution and cost parameters 
information. Ganeshan, Boone, and Stenger [45] study the impact of inventory and 
flow planning parameters on supply chain performance. 
Kapuscinksi and Tayur [46] study a capacitated production-inventory model with 
seasonal demand. They establish that the optimal policy takes the form of a 
modified order-up-to system where the producer builds up to the order-up-to level, 
or as close to this level as possible if bounded by capacity. Excess demand is 
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backlogged. Results from numerical experimentation indicate that increased mean 
demand, increased demand variability, and decreased capacity all lead to increased 
order-up-to levels. Zipkin [47] addresses the uncapacitated version of this problem.  
Moon, Kim, and Hur [48] study an integrated process planning and scheduling to 
minimize total tardiness in a multi-plants supply chain and Tipme and Kallrath [49] 
present an optimal planning in large multi-site production networks. Vergara, 
Khouja, and Michalewicz [50] discuss an algorithm optimizing material flow order 
release and Chan et. al. [51] develop a simulation model to assess order release 
mechanisms. Syarif, Yun, and Gen [52] also study a multi-stage logistics chain 
network and present a spanning tree-based generic algorithm.  
Doran [53] discusses a case study examining the characteristics of synchronous 
manufacturing within an automotive context and concludes that the nature of buyer-
supplier relationships moves toward a modular supply model. Min and Guo [54] 
develop a cooperative competition strategy in line with the modular supply model 
and Han et. al. [55] present a similar model for supply chain integration in 
developing countries. 
Masters [56] examines multi-echelon distribution inventories and develops a model 
determining near optimal stock levels. Sox and Muckstadt [57] study a multi-item, 
multi-period production planning problem with stochastic demand. They develop a 
Lagrangian relaxation algorithm that performs quite well in numerical experiments. 
Moinzadeh and Nahmias [58] develop a continuous review, stochastic demand 
inventory with two supply modes. Lead times are deterministic. One of the modes 
has a shorter lead time and is more expensive either in fixed order cost, variable 
cost, or both. This faster mode is used as an emergency mode. The form of the 
policy they analyze is a generalization of the well known (Q, R) policy, where an 
order Q1 units is placed via the slower mode when on-hand inventory drops to R1. If 
on-hand inventory drops to R2, and an order placed via the fast method will arrive 
before the outstanding order for Q1 arrives, an order for Q2 is placed. Numerical 
experiments indicate that substantial savings can be obtained by using two modes.  
Gurnani [59] studies a stochastic demand, finite horizon, periodic review inventory 
system where the probability that the supplier offers a discounted price in any time 
period is some constant β. In each period, the distributor chooses an order quantity 
at the regular price before learning if there will be a discount offered. The optimal 
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policy is defined by three regions. If inventory is above a high threshold value, order 
nothing, even if a discount is offered. If inventory is below the high threshold but 
above a lower one, it is optimal to order if a discount is offered. If inventory is below 
the low threshold value, it is optimal to order even at full price. 
Zheng [60] analyzes a continuous review model with stochastic demand and 
discount opportunities arriving according to a Poisson process. The author 
establishes that a two-tiered reorder point model (s, c, S) is optimal. That is, when 
on-hand inventory drops to s, order up to S. When a discount opportunity arrives, if 
inventory is below c, order up to S. 
Moinzadeh [61] studies a continuous review, deterministic demand model with 
discount opportunities that arrive according to a Poisson process. The optimal policy 
takes on a two-tiered form, similar to that in Zheng [60]. 
Ritchken and Tapiero [62] consider a risk management approach using negotiated 
option contracts for hedging against quality and price uncertainty in the procurement 
of inventory. They design an optimal mesh of contingent claims with purchasing 
commitments that will best meet the risk-reward preferences of the decision maker. 
Kohli and Park [63] take a game theoretical approach to the problem of deterministic 
inventory acquisition. They consider quantity discounts, which are offered by a 
monopolistic supplier in the context of a bargaining problem where the buyer and 
supplier negotiate over the average unit price and the order quantity. They consider 
both incremental and block discounts in the model and show that the outcome of the 
negotiations maximizes the joint efficiency gain between the buyer and the supplier. 
Gallego and Moon [64] analyze the newsvendor problem with normally distributed 
price-sensitive demand. Numerous extensions to the newsvendor problem have 
been proposed in the academic literature.  
Lau and Lau [65] introduce a price-sensitive demand model under two objectives: 
maximize expected profit, and maximize the probability of achieving a target level of 
profit. 
Khouja [66] examines a newsvendor model where a fixed proportion of excess 
demand can be satisfied from an emergency supply option. Two objective functions 
are examined: maximize expected profit and maximize probability of achieving a 
target profit. 
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Thomas [67] develops a model for a distributor facing price-sensitive demand and 
given the opportunity to receive a discount on fixed quantity committed deliveries. 
He also analyzes the pricing and profit implications of committed delivery strategies 
and extends his model to committed deliveries with flexible quantities. Using 
computational experiments, he shows that the value of flexibility in commitments is 
significant, especially when the commitment discount is relatively large compared to 
the holding cost. Using a constant elasticity expected demand function, simple 
expressions capturing price and profit sensitivity are developed. 
Barnes-Schuster [68] discusses how the long term contracts influence the activities 
of a buyer-supplier relationship. The author shows that system safety stocks should 
not be split between a buyer and supplier and derives conditions indicating when the 
supplier or the buyer(s) should keep the system safety stock based on system cost 
parameters, production lead times, and demand distributions. 
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CHAPTER 3. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
A supply chain consists of all stages involved, directly or indirectly, in fulfilling a 
customer request. The supply chain not only includes the manufacturer and 
suppliers, but also transporters, warehouses, retailers, and customers themselves. 
Within each organization, such as a manufacturer, the supply chain includes all 
functions involved in filling a customer request. These functions include, but not 
limited to, new product development, marketing, operations, distribution, finance, 
and customer service [2, p: 3-15]. 
A supply chain is dynamic and involves the constant flow of information, product, 
and funds between different stages. Each stage of the supply chain performs 
different processes and interacts with other stages of the supply chain. The primary 
purpose for the existence of any supply chain is to satisfy customer needs, in the 
process generating profits for itself. Supply chain activities begin with a customer 
order and end when a satisfied customer has paid for the purchase. It is important to 
visualize information, product, and funds flows along both directions of this chain 
and it may be more accurate to use the terms supply network or supply web to 
describe the structure of a supply chain [69-73]. 
Although each stage need not be present, a typical supply chain includes: 
• Suppliers 
• Manufacturers 
• Distributors 
• Retailers 
• Customers 
The objective of every supply chain is to maximize the overall value generated. The 
value a supply chain generates is the difference between what the final product is 
worth to the customer and the effort the supply chain expends in filling the 
customer’s request. For most commercial supply chains, value will be strongly 
correlated with supply chain profitability, the difference between the revenue 
generated from the customer and the overall cost across the supply chain.  
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All flows of information, product, and funds generate costs within the supply chain. 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) involves the management of flows between and 
among stages in a supply chain to maximize total profitability. 
3.1 Decision Phases in a Supply Chain 
Successful supply chain management requires several decisions relating to the flow 
of information, product, and funds. These decisions fall into three categories or 
phases, depending on the frequency of each decision and the time frame over which 
a decision phase has an impact: strategy, planning, and operation phases. 
3.1.1 Supply Chain Strategy 
During this phase, a company decides how to structure the supply chain. It decides 
what the chain’s configuration will be and what processes each stage will perform. 
Strategic decisions made by companies include the location and capacities of 
production and warehousing facilities, products to be manufactured or stored at 
various locations, modes of transportation to be made available along different 
shipping legs, and type of information system to be utilized. A company must ensure 
that the supply chain configuration supports its strategic objectives during this 
phase. Strategic supply chain decisions are typically made for the long term and are 
very expensive to alter on short notice. Consequently, when companies make these 
decisions, they must take into account uncertainty in anticipated market conditions 
over the next few years. 
3.1.2 Supply Chain Planning 
During this phase, companies define a set of operating policies that govern short 
term operations based on the supply chain’s configuration determined in the 
strategic phase that establishes constraints within which planning must be done. 
Typically, companies start the planning phase with a forecast for the coming year of 
demand in different markets. Planning includes decisions regarding which markets 
will be supplied from which locations, the planned build-up of inventories, the 
subcontracting of manufacturing, the replenishment and inventory policies to be 
followed, the policies that will be enacted regarding backup locations in case of a 
stockout, and the timing and size of marketing promotions.  Planning establishes 
parameters within which a supply chain will function over a specified period of time. 
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In the planning phase, companies must include uncertainty in demand, exchange 
rates where applicable, and competition over the time horizon in their decisions.  
3.1.3 Supply Chain Operation 
During this phase where the time horizon is weekly or daily, companies make 
decisions regarding individual customer orders. At the operational level, supply 
chain configuration is considered fixed and planning policies defined. The goal of 
supply chain operations is to implement the operating policies in the best possible 
manner. The companies allocate individual orders to inventory or production, set a 
date that an order is to be filled, generate pick lists at a warehouse, allocate an 
order to a particular shipping mode and shipment, set delivery schedules, and place 
replenishment orders. Because operational decisions are being made in the short 
term, there is less uncertainty about demand information. The goal during this phase 
is to exploit the reduction of uncertainty and optimize performance within the 
constraints established by the configuration and planning policies. 
3.2 Process View of a Supply Chain 
A supply chain is a sequence of processes and flows that take place within and 
between different supply chain stages and combine to fill a customer need for a 
product. There are two different ways to view the processes performed in a supply 
chain: Cycle view and Push/Pull view. 
3.2.1 Cycle View 
The processes in a supply chain are divided into a series of cycles, each performed 
at the interface between two successive stages of a supply chain. Given the five 
stages of a supply chain, all supply chain processes can be broken down into four 
process cycles as shown in Figure 3.1 [2, p: 8]. 
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3.2.1.1 Customer Order Cycle 
The customer order cycle occurs at the customer/retailer interface and includes all 
processes directly involved in receiving and filling the customer’s order. The 
processes involved include: 
• Customer arrival 
• Customer order entry 
• Customer order fulfillment 
• Customer order receiving 
The starting point for any supply chain is the customer arrival and a key goal is to 
facilitate the contact between the customer and the appropriate product so that the 
customer’s arrival turns into a customer order. The objective of the customer arrival 
process is to maximize the conversion of customer arrivals to customer orders. 
The term customer order entry refers to customers telling the retailer what products 
they want to purchase and the retailer allocating products to customers. The 
objective of the customer order entry process is to ensure that the order entry is 
quick and accurate and is communicated to all other supply chain processes that 
are affected by it.  
Customer
Retailer
Distributor
Manufacturer
Supplier
Customer Order Cycle
Replenishment Cycle
Manufacturing Cycle
Procurement Cycle
Figure 3.1: Supply Chain Process Cycles
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During the customer order fulfillment process, the customer’s order is filled and sent 
to the customer. All inventories will need to be updated, which may result in the 
initiation of the replenishment cycle. In general, customer order fulfillment takes 
place from retailer inventory. In a build-to-order scenario, in contrast, order 
fulfillment takes place directly from the manufacturer’s production line. The objective 
of the customer order fulfillment process is to get the correct and complete orders to 
customers by the promised due dates and at the lowest possible cost. 
During the customer order receiving process, the customer receives the order and 
takes the ownership. Records of this receipt may be updated and payment initiated.  
3.2.1.2 Replenishment Cycle 
The replenishment cycle occurs at the retailer/distributor interface and includes all 
processes involved in replenishing retailer inventory. It is initiated when a retailer 
places an order to replenish inventories to meet future demand. The replenishment 
cycle is similar to the customer order cycle except that the retailer is now the 
customer. The objective of the replenishment cycle is to replenish inventories at the 
retailer at minimum cost while providing the necessary product availability to the 
customer. The processes involved include: 
• Retail order trigger 
• Retail order entry 
• Retail order fulfillment 
• Retail order receiving 
As the retailer fills customer demand, inventory is depleted and must be replenished 
to meet future demand. A key activity the retailer performs during replenishment 
cycle is to devise replenishment or ordering policy that triggers an order. The 
objective when setting replenishment order triggers is to maximize profitability by 
balancing product availability and cost. The outcome of the retail order trigger 
process is that a replenishment order is generated. 
The retail order entry process is similar to customer order entry at the retailer. The 
only difference is that the retailer is now the customer placing the order with the 
distributor or manufacturer. The objective of the retail order entry process is that an 
order be entered accurately and conveyed quickly to all supply chain processes 
affected by the order. 
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The retail order fulfillment process is very similar to customer order fulfillment except 
that it takes place either at the distributor or the manufacturer. A key difference is 
the size of each order. Customer orders tend to be much smaller than replenishment 
orders. The objective of the retail order fulfillment is to get the replenishment order 
to the retailer on time while minimizing costs. 
Once the replenishment order arrives at a retailer, the retailer must receive it 
physically, update all inventory records, and settle all payable accounts. The 
process involves product flow from the distributor or the manufacturer to the retailer 
as well as information and financial flows. The objective of the retail order process is 
to update inventories and displays quickly and accurately at the lowest possible 
cost.  
3.2.1.3 Manufacturing Cycle 
The manufacturing cycle typically occurs at the distributor/manufacturer (or retailer/ 
manufacturer) interface and includes all processes involved in replenishing 
distributor (or retailer) inventory. The manufacturing cycle is triggered by customer 
orders, replenishment orders from a retailer or distributor, or by the forecast of 
customer demand and current product availability in the manufacturer’s finished 
product warehouse. In general, a manufacturer produces several products and fills 
demand from several sources. The manufacturing cycle can be reacting to customer 
demand (referred to as a pull process) or anticipating customer demand (referred to 
as a push process). The processes involved in the manufacturing cycle include: 
• Order arrival from the distributor, retailer, or customer 
• Production scheduling 
• Manufacturing and shipping  
• Receiving at the distributor, retailer, or customer 
During the order arrival process, a distributor sets a replenishment order trigger 
based on the forecast of future demand and current product inventories. The 
resulting order is then conveyed to the manufacturer. In some cases, the customer 
or the retailer may be ordering directly from the manufacturer. In other cases, a 
manufacturer may be producing to stock a finished product warehouse. In the latter 
situation, the order is triggered based on product availability and a forecast of future 
demand. This process is similar to the retail order trigger process in the 
replenishment cycle. 
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The production scheduling process is similar to the order entry process in the 
replenishment cycle where inventory is allocated to an order. During the production 
scheduling process, orders are allocated to a production plan or schedule. Given the 
desired production quantities, the manufacturer must decide on the precise 
production sequence. The manufacturer must also decide which products to allocate 
each line if there are multiple production lines. The objective of the production 
scheduling process is to maximize the proportion of orders filled on time while 
keeping costs down. 
The manufacturing and shipping process is equivalent to the order fulfillment 
process in the replenishment cycle. During the manufacturing phase of the process, 
the manufacturer produces to the production schedule while meeting quality 
requirements. During the shipping phase of this process, the product is shipped to 
the customer, retailer, distributor, or finished product warehouse. The objective of 
the manufacturing and shipping process is to ship the product by the promised due 
date while meeting quality requirements and keeping costs down. 
In the receiving process, the product is received at the distributor, finished goods 
warehouse, retailer, or customer, and inventory records are updated. Other 
processes related to storage and fund transfers also take place. 
3.2.1.4 Procurement Cycle 
The procurement cycle occurs at the manufacturer/supplier interface and includes 
all processes necessary to ensure that materials are available for manufacturing to 
occur according to schedule. During the procurement cycle, the manufacturer orders 
components from suppliers that replenish the component inventories. The 
relationship is quite similar to that between a distributor and manufacturer, with one 
significant difference: whereas retailer/distributor orders are triggered by uncertain 
customer demand, component orders can be determined precisely once the 
manufacturer has decided what the production schedule will be. Component orders 
are dependent on the production schedule. Thus, it is important that suppliers be 
linked to the manufacturer’s production schedule. However, if a supplier’s lead times 
are long, the supplier has to produce to forecast because the manufacturer’s 
production schedule may not be fixed that far in advance. 
In practice, there may be several tiers of suppliers, each producing a component for 
the next tier. A similar cycle would then flow back one stage to the next. 
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As a summary, the cycle view of the supply chain clearly defines the processes 
involved and the owners of each process. This view is very useful when considering 
operational decisions because it specifies the roles and responsibilities of each 
member of the supply chain and the desired outcome for each process.    
3.2.2 Push/Pull View 
All processes in a supply chain fall into one of two categories, depending on the 
timing of their execution relative to customer demand. In pull processes, execution is 
initiated in response to a customer order. Push processes are those that are 
executed in anticipation of customer orders. At the time of execution of a pull 
process, demand is known with certainty. At the time of execution of a push 
process, demand is not known and must be forecast. Pull processes may also be 
referred to as reactive processes because they react to customer demand. Push 
processes may also be referred to as speculative processes because they respond 
to forecast rather than actual demand. The push/pull boundary in a supply chain 
separates push processes from pull processes. 
A push/pull view of the supply chain is very useful when considering strategic 
decisions relating to supply chain design. This view forces a more global 
consideration of supply chain processes as they relate to a customer order. Such a 
view may result in responsibility for certain processes being passed on to a different 
stage of the supply chain if making this transfer allows a push process to become a 
pull process. Supply chain contracts help achieve these transfers. 
3.3 How to Implement Supply Chain Management 
The power of supply chain management is its potential to include the customer as a 
partner in supplying the goods or services provided by a supply chain. Integration 
improves the flow of information throughout the supply chain. Customer information 
is more than data. It is data that has been analyzed in some manner so that there is 
insight into the needs of the customer. In the typical supply chain the further the 
members of a chain are from the end customer, the less understanding these 
members have of the needs of the customer. This increases the supply chain 
member’s uncertainty and complicates the planning. Firms respond to uncertainty 
differently. Some firms may increase inventory while others may increase lead 
times. Either action reduces their ability to respond to their customers. As 
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uncertainty is reduced because they have more information, firms are able to 
develop plans with shorter lead times. By improving the information flow in the 
supply chain, firms throughout the chain have less uncertainty to resolve during the 
planning process. This, in turn, allows the chain to increase its responsiveness to 
their customers [1, p: 5-10]. 
Another advantage of integrating the customer into the supply chain is that it 
integrates the product development function with the other functions in the firm. This 
integration allows the product development staff to communicate more with the 
customer both internally and externally to the firm, which increases the firm’s 
responsiveness to the customer’s needs.  
Some firms use the concept of internal customer to remind their employees that 
each employee performs just one step in a supply chain whose purpose is to 
provide a good or service to the end customer. The purpose of the internal customer 
logic is to keep each employee focused on the needs of the end customer. This 
helps employees to recognize that not only is their firm just one link of a larger 
supply chain, but that the firm itself can be viewed as a chain of processes each of 
which is a customer of the preceding process. 
Supply chain management requires an unprecedented level of cooperation between 
the members of the supply chain. It requires an open sharing of information so that 
all members know they are receiving their full share of the profits. Since many of the 
firms in a supply chain may not have a history of cooperation, achieving the trust 
necessary for supply chain management is a crucial task.  
A firm in the supply chain must initiate the attempt to form partnerships and actively 
manage the supply chain. Often a firm that has a large amount of market power in 
the chain will become the leader of the supply chain. 
This leader firm needs to justify the effort to manage the supply chain by explaining 
the benefits that will accrue to each member in the supply chain and to itself. To do 
this, the supply chain leader must show the partners where the improvements in the 
supply chain will arise, and then how these improvements will lead to a gain for 
everyone involved. To establish trust among the members of the supply chain, the 
lead firm must also suggest how communication can be opened up and how every 
member will be ensured that it is receiving its fair share of profits.  
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Managing a supply chain is more complex and difficult than managing an individual 
firm. But, the principles of management used to integrate a firm’s own internal 
functions also apply to managing the entire supply chain. For example, a well 
understood phenomenon in the management of a firm is that there is always a 
bottleneck that constrains sales. This bottleneck may be internal to the firm (a 
process that cannot produce enough to meet demands) or it may be external to the 
firm (market demand that is less than the capacity of the firm). This principle applies 
to the entire supply chain. While the supply chain is driven by customer demand, it is 
constrained by its own internal resources. One difference is that these resources 
may not be owned by the same firm. It is possible for the output of an entire supply 
chain to be limited because one firm does not have the capacity to meet the surging 
demand. It is also possible for every firm in the supply chain to be operating at a low 
utilization because there is not enough demand in the market for the products from 
the supply chain. There are bottlenecks inside the supply chain just as there are 
bottlenecks inside firms. To properly manage the supply chain, its members must be 
aware of the location of their bottlenecks internally and also of the bottlenecks in the 
entire supply chain.   
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CHAPTER 4. SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMACE 
Creating a strategic fit between a company’s competitive strategy and its supply 
chain strategy affects performance. The intercompany scope of strategic fit requires 
firms to evaluate every action in the context of the entire supply chain. This broad 
scope increases the size of the surplus to be shared among all stages of the supply 
chain. Achieving strategic fit is critical to a company’s overall success [2, p: 25-46]. 
4.1 Competitive and Supply Chain Strategies 
A company’s competitive strategy defines the set of customer needs that it seeks to 
satisfy through its products and services. To execute a company’s competitive 
strategy, all the functions in its value chain play a role, and each must develop its 
own strategy. In an organization, the value chain consists of new product 
development, marketing and sales, operations, distribution, and service. It 
emphasizes the close relationship between all the functional strategies within a 
company. Each function is crucial if a company is to be profitably satisfying 
customer needs. Therefore, the various functional strategies cannot be formulated in 
isolation. They are closely intertwined and must fit and support each other if a 
company is to succeed. A company’s competitive strategy and its supply chain 
strategy must fit together. 
4.2 Strategic Fit 
Strategic fit means that both the competitive and supply chain strategies have the 
same goal. It refers to consistency between the customer priorities that the 
competitive strategy is designed to satisfy and the supply chain capabilities that the 
supply chain strategy aims to build. There are three basic steps to achieving this 
strategic fit: understanding the customer, understanding the supply chain, and 
achieving strategic fit [2, 74-78]. 
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4.2.1  Understanding the Customer 
To understand the customer, a company must identify the needs of the customer 
segment being served. In general, customer demand from different segments may 
vary along several attributes: 
• The quantity of the product needed in each lot 
• The response time that customers are willing to tolerate 
• The variety of products needed 
• The service level required 
• The price of the product 
• The desired rate of innovation in the product 
Each customer in a particular segment will tend to have similar needs, whereas 
customers in different segments can have very different needs. In a very 
fundamental sense, each customer need can be translated into the metric of implied 
demand uncertainty, the uncertainty that exists due to the portion of demand that the 
supply chain is required to meet. This is different than the demand uncertainty, 
which reflects the uncertainty of customer demand for a product. For example, a firm 
supplying only emergency orders for a product will face a higher implied demand 
uncertainty than a firm that supplies the same product with a long lead time. Another 
illustration of the need for this distinction is the impact of service level. As a supply 
chain raises its service level, it must be able to meet a higher and higher percentage 
of actual demand, forcing it to prepare for rare surges in demand. Thus, raising the 
service level increases the implied demand uncertainty even though the product’s 
underlying demand uncertainty does not change. As each individual customer need 
contributes significantly to the implied demand uncertainty, implied demand 
uncertainty can be used as a common metric with which to distinguish different 
types of demand. Figure 4.1 [2, p: 31] illustrates the implied uncertainty spectrum.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The Implied Uncertainty Spectrum
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The first step in achieving strategic fit is to understand customers by mapping where 
their demand is located on the implied uncertainty spectrum.   
Implied demand uncertainty is also often correlated with other characteristics of the 
demand, as shown in Table 4.1 [2, p: 31]. 
Table 4.1: Correlation Between Implied Demand Uncertainty and Other Attributes 
Attribute Low Implied Uncertainty High Implied Uncertainty 
1. Product margin 
2. Average forecast error 
3. Average stockout rate 
4. Average forced  
season-end markdown 
Low 
10% 
1% to 2% 
0% 
High 
40% to 100% 
10% to 40% 
10% to 25% 
1. Products with uncertain demand are often less mature and have less direct 
competition. As a result, margins tend to be high. 
2. Forecasting is more accurate when demand is more certain. 
3. Increased implied demand uncertainty leads to increased difficulty matching 
supply with demand. For a given product, this dynamic can lead to either a 
stockout or an oversupply situation. Increased implied demand uncertainty thus 
leads to both higher oversupply and a higher stockout rate. 
4. Markdowns are high for products with high implied demand uncertainty because 
oversupply often results. 
4.2.2 Understanding the Supply Chain 
Creating strategic fit is all about creating a supply chain strategy that best meets the 
particular type of demand that a company has targeted. Like customer needs, 
supply chains have many different characteristics. Supply chain responsiveness 
includes a supply chain’s ability to: 
• Respond to wide ranges of quantities demanded 
• Meet short lead times 
• Handle a large variety of products 
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• Build highly innovative products 
• Meet a very high service level 
Responsiveness, however, comes at a cost. Supply chain efficiency is the cost of 
making and delivering a product to the customer. Increases in cost lower efficiency. 
For every strategic choice to increase responsiveness, there are additional costs 
that lower efficiency. The trade-off between responsiveness and efficiency can be 
represented by the cost-responsiveness efficient frontier curve as shown in Figure 
4.2 [2, p: 33]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The efficient frontier represents the cost-responsiveness performance of the best 
supply chains. Not every firm is able to perform on the efficient frontier. A firm that is 
not on the efficient frontier can improve both its responsiveness and its cost 
performance by moving toward the efficient frontier. In contrast, a firm on the 
efficient frontier can improve its responsiveness only by increasing cost and 
becoming less efficient. Of course, firms on the efficient frontier can also improve 
their processes and change technology to shift the efficient frontier itself. Given the 
trade-off between cost and responsiveness, a key strategic choice for any supply 
chain is the level of responsiveness it seeks to provide. Figure 4.3 [2, p: 33] shows 
the responsiveness spectrum and where some different supply chains fall on this 
spectrum. 
 
Figure 4.2: Cost-Responsiveness Efficient Frontier
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The second step in achieving strategic fit is to understand the supply chain and map 
it on the responsiveness spectrum.  
4.2.3 Achieving Strategic Fit 
The third and final step in achieving strategic fit is to match supply chain 
responsiveness with the implied demand uncertainty in the zone of strategic fit. All 
functional strategies within the value chain must also support the supply chain’s 
level of responsiveness. In other words, the degree of supply chain responsiveness 
should be consistent with the implied demand uncertainty. 
The graph shown in Figure 4.4 [2, p: 35] is referred to as uncertainty/responsiveness 
map. A point in this graph represents a combination of implied demand uncertainty 
and supply chain responsiveness.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The Responsiveness Spectrum
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The implied demand uncertainty represents customer needs or the firm’s strategic 
position. The supply chain’s responsiveness represents the supply chain strategy.  
In order to achieve strategic fit, the greater the implied demand uncertainty, and the 
more responsive the supply chain should be. Increasing implied demand uncertainty 
from customers is best served with increasing responsiveness from the supply 
chain. This relationship is represented by the zone of strategic fit. For a high level of 
performance, companies should gear their competitive strategy toward the zone of 
strategic fit. 
To achieve complete strategic fit, a firm must consider all functional strategies within 
the value chain. It must ensure that all functions in the value chain have consistent 
strategies that support the competitive strategy. Table 4.2 [2, p: 36] lists some of the 
major differences in functional strategy between supply chains that are efficient and 
those that are responsive. 
Table 4.2: Comparison of Efficient and Responsive Supply Chains 
 Efficient Supply Chains Responsive Supply Chains 
Primary Goal 
 
 
Product Design 
Strategy 
 
 
Pricing Strategy 
 
 
 
Manufacturing Strategy 
 
 
 
Inventory Strategy 
 
 
Lead time strategy 
 
 
Supplier Strategy 
 
 
Transportation Strategy 
Supply demand at the 
lowest cost 
 
Maximize performance at 
a minimum product cost 
 
 
Lower margins because 
price is a prime customer 
driver 
 
Lower costs through high 
utilization 
 
 
Minimize inventory to 
lower cost 
 
Reduce but not at the 
expense of costs 
 
Select based on cost and 
quality 
 
Greater reliance on low 
cost modes 
Respond quickly to demand 
 
 
Create modularity to allow 
postponement of product 
differentiation 
 
Higher margins as price is 
not a prime customer driver 
 
 
Maintain capacity flexibility 
to meet unexpected 
demand 
 
Maintain buffer inventory to 
meet unexpected demand 
 
Aggressively reduce even if 
the costs are significant 
 
Select based on speed, 
flexibility, and quality 
 
Greater reliance on 
responsive modes 
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4.2.3.1 Multiple Products and Customer Segments 
Most companies produce and sell multiple products and serve multiple customer 
segments, each with different characteristics. A department store may sell seasonal 
products with high implied demand uncertainty along with products with low implied 
demand uncertainty. The demand in each case maps to different parts of the 
uncertainty spectrum. When devising supply chain strategy, the key issue for a 
company is then to create a supply chain that balances efficiency and 
responsiveness given its portfolio of products and customer segments. 
There are several possible routes a company can take. One is to set up 
independent supply chains for each different product or customer segment. This 
strategy is feasible if each segment is large enough to support a dedicated supply 
chain. A preferable strategy is to tailor the supply chain to best meet the needs of 
each product’s demand, taking advantage of any economies of scope that often 
exist between a company’s different products. 
Tailoring the supply chain requires sharing some links in the supply chain with other 
products while having separate operations for other links. The links are shared to 
achieve maximum possible efficiency while providing the appropriate level of 
responsiveness to each segment. Appropriate tailoring of the supply chain helps a 
firm achieve varying levels of responsiveness for a low overall cost. 
4.2.3.2 Product Life Cycle 
As products go through their life cycles, the demand characteristics and the needs 
of the customer segments being served change. High-tech products are particularly 
prone to these life cycle swings over a very compressed time span. A product goes 
through life cycle phases from the introductory phase, when only the leading edge of 
customers is interested in it, all the way to the point at which the product becomes a 
commodity and the market is completely saturated. To maintain strategic fit, a 
company’s supply chain strategy must evolve as its products enter different phases. 
As the product becomes a commodity product later in its life cycle demand becomes 
more certain, margins are lower due to an increase in competitors, and price 
becomes a significant factor in customer choice. As products mature, the 
corresponding supply chain strategy should, in general, move from being responsive 
to being efficient, as illustrated in Figure 4.5 [2, p: 39].   
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The key point here is that demand characteristics change over a product’s life cycle. 
Because demand characteristics change, the supply chain strategy must change 
over the product’s life cycle as well if a company is to continue achieving strategic 
fit. The change in supply chain strategy and the change in demand characteristics 
must mesh. 
4.2.3.3 Competitive Changes over Time 
Like product life cycles, competitors can change the landscape, thereby requiring 
changes in a firm’s competitive strategy. As competitors flood the marketplace with 
product variety, customers are becoming accustomed to having their individual 
needs satisfied. Thus, the competitive focus is on producing sufficient variety at a 
reasonable price. As the competitive landscape changes, a firm is forced to alter its 
competitive strategy. With the change in competitive strategy, a firm must also 
change its supply chain strategy to maintain strategic fit. 
4.3 Expanding Strategic Scope 
A key issue related to strategic fit is the scope, in terms of supply chain stages, 
across which the strategic fit applies. Scope of strategic fit refers to the functions 
and stages within a supply chain that devise an integrated strategy with a shared 
objective. At one extreme, every operation within each functional area devises its 
Figure 4.5: Changes in Supply Chain Strategy over a Product’s Life Cycle
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own independent strategy with the objective of optimizing its own performance. In 
this case, the scope of strategic fit is restricted to an operation in a functional area 
within a stage of the supply chain. At the opposite extreme, all functional areas 
within all stages of the supply chain devise strategy jointly with a common objective 
of maximizing supply chain profit. In this case, the scope of strategic fit extends 
across the entire supply chain. 
Figure 4.6 [2, p: 41-44] represents the scope of strategic fits across different supply 
chain stages versus different functional strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Intracompany Intraoperation Scope: The Minimize Local Cost View 
The most limited scope over which strategic fit has been considered is one 
operation within a functional area in a company where each operation within each 
stage of the supply chain devises strategy independently. The intracompany 
intraoperation scope often results in different operations and functions having 
conflicting objectives. 
Figure 4.6: Scopes of Supply Chain Strategy and Strategic Fits
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4.3.2 Intracompany Intrafunctional Scope: The Minimize Functional Cost 
View 
With the intracompany intrafunctional scope, the strategic fit is expanded to include 
all operations within a function. The key weakness of the intracompany 
intrafunctional view is that different functions may have conflicting objectives and 
may hurt the firm’s overall performance. 
4.3.3 Intracompany Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Company Profit 
View   
With intracompany interfunctional scope, the goal is to maximize company profit. To 
achieve this goal, all functional strategies are developed to support each other and 
the competitive strategy. However, intracompany interfunctional scope of strategic fit 
has still two major weaknesses.  
The first derives from the fact that the only positive cash flow for the supply chain 
occurs when the customer pays for the product. All other cash flows are simply a 
resettling of accounts within the supply chain and add to supply chain cost. The 
difference between what the customer pays and the total cost generated across the 
supply chain represents the supply chain surplus. The supply chain surplus 
represents the total profit to be shared across all companies in the supply chain. 
Increasing supply chain surplus increases the amount to be shared among all 
members of the supply chain. The intracompany interfunctional scope leads to each 
stage of the supply chain trying to maximize its own profits, which does not 
necessarily result in the maximization of the supply chain surplus. Supply chain 
surplus is maximized only when all supply chain stages coordinate strategy 
together.  
The second major weakness of the intracompany scope becomes apparent when 
speed becomes a key driver of supply chain success. The companies can succeed 
not only because they have the lowest priced or highest quality products, but also 
because they are able to respond quickly to market needs and get the right product 
to the right customer at the right time. However, the most significant delays are 
created at the interface between the boundaries of different stages of a supply 
chain. 
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4.3.4  Intercompany Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Supply Chain 
Surplus View  
The intercompany scope forces every stage of the supply chain to look across the 
entire supply chain and evaluate the impact of its actions on other stages as well on 
the interfaces. A company’s partners in the supply chain may well determine the 
company’s success, as the company is intimately tied to its supply chain. This broad 
scope increases the size of the surplus to be shared among all stages of the supply 
chain. Intercompany view requires that each company evaluate its actions in the 
context of the entire supply chain. Supply chain contracts help achieve this scope. 
4.3.5  Flexible Intercompany Interfunctional Scope 
Flexibility refers to a firm’s ability to achieve strategic fit when partnering with stages 
that change over time in the supply chain. Firms must think in terms of supply chains 
consisting of many partners at each stage. The flexible intercompany scope allows 
strategic fit to apply to a moving target. Flexibility becomes more important as the 
competitive environment becomes more dynamic. 
4.4  Demand Driven Supply Chain 
Supply chain surplus is maximized only when all supply chain stages coordinate 
strategy together. However, a supply chain’s surplus is also significantly impacted 
by demand. Revenues are typically higher when overall demand increases in 
general. On the other hand, consumer demand for most products and services are a 
function of the price the customer is willing to pay. If an increase in a product’s price 
has a direct negative relationship with the total demand, this elasticity will create a 
reduction or shift in the total demand. Therefore, price elasticity is a key factor 
influencing the supply chain surplus and must be incorporated into supply chain 
contracts and strategies aimed to achieve maximum surplus. In section 5, constant 
and linear elasticity functions will be discussed and used as an integral part of any 
supply chain contracts aimed to maximize the supply chain surplus. 
Another key factor is to understand the demand patterns. The major demand 
patterns are shown in Figure 4.7 [74, p: 30]. A constant/horizontal pattern with 
normally distributed demand where the mean demand is a function of the selling 
price is used in this dissertation.  
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Figure 4.7: Major Demand Patterns 
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Coupled with these demand patterns, the product life cycle is another primary driver 
for demand economics impacting the overall supply chain surplus. Consumer 
demand for most products and services varies over time and forms natural demand 
patterns. There are six primary phases of the product life cycle. These phases 
include pre-launch, introduction, growth, maturity, decline, and retired as shown in 
Figure 4.8 [74, p: 28]. A product that currently resides in a specific stage of the cycle 
will have a different demand pattern from a product in another stage. The actual 
shape of this bell curve is based on the specific nature of the product and the 
industry, the competitive intensity, and the level of marketing investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pre-launch phase of the life cycle has practically no demand. Estimates of 
market share, prices, and potential demand are all outcomes of this phase in the 
process. 
During the introduction phase of the life cycle, demand can exhibit multiple patterns. 
At this point, demand is very uncertain and management of demand is based on 
either associating similar patterns experienced for other new products introduced 
historically, or by market research estimates. 
Figure 4.8: Product Life Cycle Curve 
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As products reach the growth phase, demand becomes more stable and 
predictable. Demand management can use trends and statistics to define the 
pattern accurately. 
During the maturity phase, demand is quite stable. As products mature, the 
corresponding supply chain strategy should, in general, move from being responsive 
to being efficient, as previously illustrated in Figure 4.5. The demand functions used 
in this dissertation assume that the products are in their maturity phases. 
Predicting demand during the decline phases is often the most difficult. The intensity 
and timing of the decline make it very difficult to understand the demand pattern. 
The best way to analyze the product’s decline is to explore historical similar product 
declines and associate a similar intensity and timing evidenced in other products 
and categories. Prices tend to be at historical lows during the decline phase. 
At the retired phase, the product has been phased out. All demand that existed has 
either been transferred to a complementary or replacement item, or has been 
moved to a competitor’s product. 
In summary, each of the phases of the life cycle result in changes to the demand 
pattern, and likewise require a different type of technique to analyze and manage 
demand. The use of collaboration within the chain is essential during all phases of 
the product life cycle in order to achieve improved and accurate forecasts.  
4.5 Supply Chain Performance Drivers 
The strategic fit requires that a company achieve the balance between 
responsiveness and efficiency in its supply chain that best meets the needs of the 
company’s competitive strategy [75-80]. The drivers of supply chain performance 
not only determine its performance in terms of responsiveness and efficiency, they 
also determine whether strategic fit is achieved across the supply chain [2, p: 49-
60]. The five drivers of supply chain performance are:  
• Inventory 
• Transportation 
• Facilities 
• Information 
• Contracts 
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Inventory is all raw materials, work in process, and finished goods within a supply 
chain. Inventory is an important supply chain driver because changing inventory 
policies can dramatically alter the supply chain’s efficiency and responsiveness. 
Transportation entails moving inventory from point to point in the supply chain. 
Transportation can take the form of many combinations of modes and routes, each 
with its own performance characteristics and transportation choices have a large 
impact on supply chain responsiveness and efficiency. 
Facilities are the places in the supply chain network where inventory is stored, 
assembled, or fabricated. The two major types of facilities are production sites and 
storage sites. Whatever the function of the facility, decisions regarding location, 
capacity, and flexibility of facilities have a significant impact on the supply chain’s 
performance. 
Information consists of data and analysis regarding inventory, transportation, and 
customers throughout the supply chain. Information is potentially the biggest driver 
of performance in the supply chain as it directly affects the other drivers. 
Contracts are most effective for governance and specify the parameters within 
which a buyer places orders and a supplier fulfills them. Contracts can potentially 
increase the total supply chain surplus and they are the core subject of this 
dissertation. Contracts will be discussed in details in Chapter 6. 
4.5.1  Inventory 
Increasing the inventory will generally make the supply chain more responsive to the 
customer. However, this choice comes as at a cost as the added inventory 
decreases efficiency [81-86]. 
4.5.1.1 Role in the Supply Chain 
Inventory exists in the supply chain because of a mismatch between supply and 
demand. This mismatch is intentional at the retailer in anticipation of future demand. 
An important role that inventory plays in the supply chain is to increase the amount 
of demand that can be satisfied by having the product ready and available when the 
customer wants it. Supply Chain contracts play a significant role to achieve this 
purpose. Another significant role inventory plays is to reduce cost by exploiting any 
economies of scale that may exist during both production and distribution. 
  37 
Inventory is spread throughout the supply chain from raw materials to work in 
process to finished goods that suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers 
hold. Inventory is a major source of cost in a supply chain, and it has a huge impact 
on responsiveness. 
Inventory has also a significant impact on the material flow time in a supply chain 
defined as the time that elapses between the point at which material enters the 
supply chain to the point at which it exits. Another important area where inventory 
has a significant impact is throughput, the rate at which sales to the end customer 
occur. If inventory is represented by I, flow time by T, and throughput by R, the three 
can be related as [2, p: 52]: 
I = RT                  (4.1) 
Reduced flow time can be a significant advantage in a supply chain by reducing the 
inventory needed without reducing responsiveness. 
4.5.1.2 Role in the Competitive Strategy 
Inventory plays a significant role in a supply chain’s ability to support a firm’s 
competitive strategy. If a firm’s competitive strategy requires a very high level of 
responsiveness, a company can use inventory to achieve this responsiveness by 
allocating large amounts of inventory close to the customer. Conversely, a company 
can also use inventory to make itself more efficient by reducing inventory through 
centralized stocking. The latter strategy would support a competitive strategy of 
being a low cost producer. The trade-off implicit in the inventory driver is between 
the responsiveness that results from more inventory and the efficiency that results 
from less inventory. 
4.5.1.3 Components of Inventory Decisions 
Major inventory related decisions to create more responsive and more efficient 
supply chains involve cycle inventory, safety inventory, and seasonal inventory. 
Cycle inventory is the average amount of inventory used to satisfy demand between 
receipts of supplier shipments. The size of the cycle inventory is a result of the 
production or purchase of materials in large lots to exploit economies of scale in the 
production, transportation, or purchasing process. The basic trade-off is the cost of 
holding larger lots of inventory versus the cost of ordering the product frequently. 
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Safety inventory is held just in case demand exceeds expectations to counter 
uncertainty. Choosing safety inventory involves making a trade-off between the 
costs of having too much inventory and the costs of lost sales due to not having 
enough inventory. 
Seasonal inventory is built up to counter predictable variability in demand. 
Companies using seasonal inventory will build up inventory in periods of low 
demand and store it for periods of high demand when they will not have the capacity 
to produce all that is demanded. If a company can rapidly change the rate of its 
production system at low cost, then it may not need seasonal inventory. The basic 
trade-off is the cost of carrying the additional seasonal inventory versus the cost of 
having a more flexible production rate. 
4.5.2  Transportation 
The fundamental trade-off for transportation is between efficiency, the cost of 
transporting a given product, and responsiveness, the speed with which the product 
is transported [87-93]. 
4.5.2.1 Role in the Supply Chain 
Transportation moves the product between different stages in a supply chain. Like 
the other supply chain drivers, transportation has a large impact on both 
responsiveness and efficiency. Faster transportation, whether in the form of different 
modes of transportation or different amounts being transported, allows a supply 
chain to be more responsive but reduces its efficiency. The type of transportation a 
company uses also affects the inventory and facility locations in the supply chain.  
4.5.2.2 Role in the Competitive Strategy 
The role of transportation in a company’s competitive strategy figures prominently 
when the company is considering the target customer’s need. If its competitive 
strategy targets a customer that demands a very high level of responsiveness and 
that customer is willing to pay for this responsiveness, then a company can use 
transportation as one driver for making the supply chain more responsive. On the 
other hand, if it targets customers whose main criterion is price, then the company 
can use transportation to lower the cost of the product at the expense of 
responsiveness.  
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As a company may use both inventory and transportation to increase 
responsiveness or efficiency, the optimal decision for the company often means 
finding the right balance between the two. 
4.5.2.3 Components of Transportation Decisions 
Major transportation related decisions to create more responsive and more efficient 
supply chains involve mode of transportation, route and network selection, and in 
house or outsource decisions. 
The mode of transportation is the manner in which a product is moved from one 
location in the supply chain network to another. Companies have four basic modes 
from which to choose. In decreasing responsiveness, companies may choose air, 
truck, rail, or ship transportation modes. Depending on the product, pipeline and 
electronic transportation can also be used. Each mode has different characteristics 
with respect to the speed, size of shipments, cost of shipping, and flexibility that lead 
companies to choose one particular mode over the others.  
Another major transportation decision is the route and network along which products 
are shipped. A route is the path along which a product is shipped, and a network is 
the collection of locations and routes along which a product can be shipped. A 
company may need to decide whether to ship products directly to customers or to 
use a series of distribution layers. Companies make some routing decisions at the 
supply chain’s design stage, and they make others on a short term basis. 
Traditionally, much of the transportation function has been performed in house. 
Today, however, much of transportation, even entire logistics systems, is 
outsourced. Having to choose between bringing parts of transportation in house or 
outsourcing leads to another dimension of complexity when companies are 
designing their transportation systems. In this dissertation, transportation related 
costs are not considered separately, but rather assumed to be included in the unit 
price. 
4.5.3 Facilities 
The fundamental trade-off for facilities is between efficiency, the cost of the number, 
location, and type of facilities, and the level of responsiveness that these facilities 
provide the company’s customers [88, 94-98]. 
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4.5.3.1 Role in the Supply Chain 
If inventory is what is being passed along the supply chain and transportation as 
how it is passed along, then facilities are the where of the supply chain. They are the 
locations to or from which the inventory is transported. Within a facility, inventory is 
either transformed into another state, manufacturing, or stored before being shipped 
to the next stage, warehousing. 
4.5.3.2 Role in the Competitive Strategy 
Facilities and their corresponding capacities to perform their functions is a key driver 
of supply chain performance in terms of responsiveness and efficiency. Companies 
may gain economies of scale when a product is manufactured or stored in only one 
location. This centralization increases efficiency. However, the cost reduction comes 
at the expense of responsiveness, as many of company’s customers may be located 
far from the production facility. On the other hand, locating facilities close to 
customers increases the number of facilities needed and consequently reduces 
efficiency. However, if the customer demands and is willing to pay for the 
responsiveness that having numerous facilities adds, then this facilities decision 
helps meet the company’s competitive strategy goals.   
4.5.3.3 Components of Facilities Decisions 
The components of facilities decisions are the location, capacity, manufacturing 
methodology, and various warehousing methodologies. 
Deciding where a company will locate its facilities constitutes a large part of the 
design of a supply chain. A basic trade-off is whether to centralize to gain 
economies of scale or decentralize to become more responsive by being closer to 
the customer. Companies must also consider related issues to the characteristics of 
the local area in which the facility may be situated. These include macroeconomic 
factors, strategic factors, quality and cost of workers, cost of facility, availability of 
infrastructure, proximity to customers and the rest of the network, and tax effects. 
Companies must also decide what a facility’s capacity to perform its intended 
function or functions will be. A large amount of excess capacity allows the facility to 
be very flexible and to respond to wide swings in the demands placed on it. Excess 
capacity, however, costs money and therefore can decrease efficiency. A facility 
with little excess capacity will likely be more efficient per unit of product it produces 
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than one with a lot of unused capacity. On the other hand, the high utilization facility 
will have difficulty responding to demand fluctuations. Therefore a company must 
make a trade-off between flexibility and efficiency to determine the right amount of 
capacity to have at each of its facilities. 
Companies must also make a major decision regarding the manufacturing 
methodology that a facility will use. They must decide whether to design a facility 
with a product focus or a functional focus. A product focused factory performs many 
different functions, such as fabrication and assembly, in producing a single type of 
product. A functional focused factory performs few functions, such as only 
fabrication or only assembly, on many types of products. A product focus tends to 
result in more expertise about a particular type of product at the expense of the 
functional expertise that comes from a functional manufacturing methodology. 
Companies must decide which type of expertise will best enable them to meet 
customer needs. They must also make a decision regarding the relative level of 
flexible versus dedicated capacity in their portfolios. Flexible capacity can be used 
for many types of products but is often less efficient whereas the more efficient 
dedicated capacity can be used for only a limited number of products. The trade-off 
is again between efficiency and responsiveness.  
As with manufacturing, there are a variety of methodologies from which companies 
can choose when designing a warehouse facility, including Stock-keeping Unit 
(SKU) storage, Job Lot Storage, and Crossdocking. 
4.5.4 Information 
Many information systems increase both responsiveness and efficiency. The trade-
off is between the cost of information which comes with a reduction in efficiency and 
the responsiveness that information creates in the supply chain. 
4.5.4.1 Role in the Supply Chain 
Information could be overlooked as a major supply chain driver because it does not 
have a physical presence. Information, however, affects every part of the supply 
chain in many ways [99-108]. It serves as the connection between the supply 
chain’s various stages, allowing them to coordinate their actions and bring about 
many of the benefits of maximizing total supply chain profitability. Information is also 
crucial to the daily operations of each stage in a supply chain.  
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4.5.4.2 Role in the Competitive Strategy 
Information is a driver whose importance has grown as companies have used it to 
become both more efficient and responsive. The tremendous growth of the 
importance of information technology is a testimony to the impact information can 
have on improving a company. However, like the other drivers, even with 
information, companies reach a point where they must make the trade-off between 
efficiency and responsiveness. 
Another key decision involves what information is most valuable in reducing cost 
and improving responsiveness within a supply chain. This decision will vary 
depending on the supply chain structure and the market segments served.   
4.5.4.3 Components of Information Decisions 
Key components of information within a supply chain to increase efficiency and 
improve responsiveness are push versus pull, coordination and information sharing, 
forecasting and aggregate planning, and enabling technologies. 
When designing processes in the supply chain, managers must determine whether 
these processes are part of the push or pull phase in the chain. Push systems 
generally require information in the form of elaborate material requirements planning 
(MRP) systems to take the master production schedule and roll it back, creating 
schedules for suppliers with part types, quantities, and delivery dates. Pull systems 
require information on actual demand to be transmitted extremely quickly throughout 
the entire chain so that production and distribution of parts and products can 
accurately reflect the real demand. Just-in-time (JIT) production is often referred as 
a pull system.  
Supply chain coordination occurs when all the different stages of a supply chain 
work toward the objective of maximizing total supply chain profitability, rather than 
each stage devoting itself to its own profitability. Again, supply chain contracts can 
play a significant role to achieve this objective. Lack of coordination may result in a 
significant loss of total supply chain profit. Coordination between different stages in 
a supply chain requires each stage to share appropriate information with other 
stages. 
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Forecasting is the art and science of making projections about what future needs 
and conditions will be. Obtaining forecasting information frequently means using 
sophisticated techniques to estimate future demand or market conditions. 
Companies often use forecasts both on a tactical level to schedule production and 
on a strategic level to determine whether to build new plants or even whether to 
enter a new market. Aggregate planning transforms forecasts into plans of activity to 
satisfy the projected demand. A company’s aggregate plan significantly affects the 
demand on both its suppliers and its supply to its customers. 
Today, many technologies exist that share and analyze information in the supply 
chain [109-112]. The technologies include Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the 
Internet, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
software, and Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS). As we will see in Chapter 
5, these technologies are vital for successful supply chain contract implementations. 
4.6 Obstacles to Achieving Strategic Fit 
A company’s ability to find a balance between responsiveness and efficiency along 
the responsiveness spectrum that best matches the type of demand it is targeting is 
the key to achieving strategic fit. In deciding where this balance should be located 
on the responsiveness spectrum, companies must overcome the following 
obstacles. Many of these obstacles have made it increasingly difficult for supply 
chains to achieve strategic fit [2, p: 60-62]. Overcoming these obstacles offers a 
tremendous opportunity for firms to use supply chain performance drivers, including 
supply chain contracts, to gain competitive advantage. 
4.6.1 Increasing Variety of Products 
With customers demanding ever more customized products, manufacturers have 
responded with mass customization. The increase in product variety complicated the 
supply chain by making forecasting and meeting demand much more difficult. The 
rise of e-commerce, which makes it easy to offer variety to the customer, reinforces 
the customization trend. Increase variety tends to raise uncertainty, and uncertainty 
frequently results in increased cost and decreased responsiveness within the supply 
chain. Again, supply chain contracts can help overcome this obstacle. 
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4.6.2  Decreasing Product Life Cycles 
In addition to the increasing variety of product types, the life cycle of products has 
been shrinking. This decrease in product life cycles makes the job of achieving 
strategic fit more difficult, as the supply chain must constantly adapt to manufacture 
and deliver new products in addition to coping with these product’s demand 
uncertainty. Shorter life cycles increase uncertainty while reducing the window of 
opportunity within which the supply chain can achieve strategic fit. Increased 
uncertainty combined with a smaller window of opportunity has put additional 
pressure on supply chains to coordinate and create a good match between supply 
and demand. Once again, supply chain contracts can be used to create this match. 
4.6.3 Increasingly Demanding Customers 
Companies can clearly see how customer demands have increased when 
considering delivery lead times, cost, and product performance. Today’s customers 
are demanding faster fulfillment, better quality, and better performing products for 
the same price they paid years ago meaning that the supply chain must provide 
more just to maintain its business. 
4.6.4  Fragmentation of Supply Chain Ownership 
Over the past several decades, most firms have become less vertically integrated. 
As companies have shed noncore functions, they have been able to take advantage 
of supplier and customer competencies that they themselves did not have. However, 
this new ownership structure has also made managing the supply chain more 
difficult. With the chain broken into many owners, each with its own policies and 
interests, the chain is more difficult to coordinate. Potentially, this problem could 
cause each stage of a supply chain to work only toward its own objectives rather 
than the whole chain’s, resulting in the reduction of overall supply chain profitability. 
As we will see in Chapter 6, supply chain contracts can be used very effectively to 
overcome this obstacle.  
4.6.5 Globalization 
The increase in globalization over the past few decades has had two main impacts 
on the supply chain. The first impact is that supply chains are now more likely than 
ever to be global. Having a global supply chain creates many benefits, such as the 
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ability to source from a global base of suppliers who may offer better and cheaper 
goods than were available in a company’s home nation. However, globalization also 
adds stress to the chain because facilities within the chain are farther apart, making 
coordination more difficult. 
The second impact of globalization is an increase in competition. This competitive 
situation makes supply chain performance a key to maintaining and growing sales 
while also putting more strain on supply chains and thus forcing them to make their 
trade-offs even more precisely. 
4.6.6  Difficulty in Executing New Strategies 
Creating a successful supply chain strategy is not easy. However, once a good 
strategy is formulated, actually executing the strategy can even be more difficult. 
Many high talented employees at all levels of the organization are necessary to 
make a supply chain strategy successful. The increasing impact of all these 
obstacles has led to supply chain management becoming a major factor in the 
success or failure of firms. 
4.7 Managing Predictable Variability 
As discussed in Section 4.5, aggregate planning transforms forecasts into plans of 
activity to satisfy the projected demand. A company’s aggregate plan significantly 
affects the demand on both its suppliers and its supply to its customers. For 
products whose demand is stable with little change in volume over time, devising an 
aggregate plan is simple. In such cases, a company arranges for sufficient capacity 
to match the expected demand and then produces an amount to match that 
demand. Products are made close to the time when they will be sold. The supply 
chain carries little inventory [2, p: 121-127]. 
However, demand for many products changes from period to period, often due to a 
predictable influence such as seasonal factors and promotions [113-116]. 
Predictable demand is the change in demand that can be forecasted. Products that 
undergo this type of change in demand cause numerous problems in the supply 
chain, ranging from high levels of stockouts during peak demand periods to high 
levels of excess inventory during periods of low demand. These problems increase 
the cost of products and decrease the responsiveness of the supply chain. Supply 
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and demand management will have the greatest impact when it is applied to 
predictably variable products. 
A company must choose between two broad options to handle predictable 
variability: managing supply and managing demand.  
4.7.1  Managing Supply 
Supply of products can be controlled by a combination of production capacity and 
inventory. When managing capacity to meet predictable demand, companies use a 
combination of the following approaches: 
• Time flexibility from workforce 
• Use of seasonal workforce 
• Use of subcontracting 
• Use of both dedicated and flexible facilities 
• Designing product flexibility into the production processes 
When managing inventory to meet predictable variability, companies use a 
combination of the following approaches: 
• Using common components across multiple products 
• Build inventory of high demand or predictable demand products 
4.7.2  Managing Demand 
In many instances, supply chains can influence demand in different periods using 
pricing and other forms of promotion. When a promotion is offered during a period, 
that period’s demand will tend to go up. This increase in demand results from a 
combination of the following factors: 
• Market growth 
• Stealing share 
• Forward buying 
The first two factors increase the overall demand whereas the third simply shifts 
future demand to the present.  
In Chapter 6, we will discuss how product availability and supply chain profits are 
affected by contracts between stages of the supply chain. Effective use of contracts 
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as a supply chain driver can substantially increase the overall supply chain 
profitability and its competitive advantage.  
4.8 Implications of Supply Chain Management in Agile Manufacturing 
Supply chain management evolution has provided a number of practices that 
directly relate to improving agility within and between organizations [117-128]. 
Changing customer and technological requirements force manufacturers to develop 
agile supply chain capabilities in order to be competitive. The requirements for 
organizations to become more responsive to the needs of customers, the changing 
conditions of competition, and increasing levels of environmental turbulence is 
driving the concept of agility. The concept has also been extended beyond the 
traditional boundaries of the individual organization to encompass the operations of 
the supply chain within which the organization operates. It is imperative for 
companies to cooperate and leverage complementary competencies such as using 
market knowledge and a virtual corporation to exploit profitable opportunities in a 
volatile marketplace. There has also been much research combining the lean 
philosophy and agile manufacturing [129-135]. 
Agility performance factors such as time, cost, flexibility, dependability are all 
affected by the management of the supply chain. The following have been defined 
as exemplary practices for strategic supplier relationships [136, p: 361]: 
• Development of long term, performance oriented supplier partnerships, 
• Continuous quality improvement and joint learning by both the customer and 
its supplier base, 
• Focus on total cost of ownership, not just on price, 
• Companies are taking a boundaryless view of their participation in the 
supply chain, 
• Long term contracts, 
• Multi level relationship across the organization including inter company 
project teams, 
• Critical buying decision based on value, 
• Early involvement in marketing, design, and product development cycle, 
• Exchange of information including not only information on work in progress, 
but also information on basic costs and insight into long term strategy, 
• Integrated quality control, 
• Mutual support and joint problem solving, 
• Joint teams sharing information and expertise,  
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• A genuine insight into the buy decision and market forces up and down the 
supply chain, and 
• Two or three suppliers at most, with single sourcing agreements, thus 
enabling the purchasing, engineering, production, and quality personnel to 
work more closely. 
Strategic supplier relationships exist in a number of industries and are on the rise. 
Supply chain contracts are part of these partnerships and alliances. 
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CHAPTER 5. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STRUCTURE AND SUPPLY 
CHAIN CONTRACTS 
The impact of technology upon the development and rapid expansion of supply 
chain collaboration has been profound. In this chapter, we will discuss how 
technology drives and facilitates supply chain integration, a vital necessity for 
successful supply chain contract implementations. 
5.1 Information Networks 
Supply chain information systems initiate activities and track information regarding 
processes and facilitates information sharing both within the firm and between 
supply chain partners resulting to successful supply chain contracts. All component 
systems must be integrated to provide comprehensive functionality for analyzing, 
initiating, and monitoring supply chain operations [137, p: 191-196], thus facilitating 
the supply chain contracts with timely and accurate information.  
5.1.1  Information System Functionality 
There are four reasons why timely and accurate information is vital. First, customers 
perceive information about order status, product availability, delivery schedule, 
shipment tracking, and invoices as necessary elements of total customer service. 
Customers demand access to real time information. Second, with the goal of 
reducing total supply chain assets, thus supply chain profitability, information can be 
used to reduce inventory and human resource requirements, especially by 
minimizing demand uncertainty. Third, information increases flexibility in supply 
chain contracts with regard to how, when, and where resources may be utilized to 
gain strategic advantage. Fourth, enhanced information transfer and exchange 
capability utilizing the Internet is changing relationships between buyers and sellers 
and redefining channel relationships. Supply chain information systems (SCIS) 
provide integration on four levels of functionality: transaction systems, management 
control, decision analysis, and strategic planning.  
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A transaction system is characterized by formalized rules, procedures, and 
standardized communications [138-141]. The combination of structured processes 
and large transaction volume initiated by supply chain contracts places a major 
emphasis on information system efficiency on transaction activities including, but not 
limited to, order entry, inventory assignment, order selection, shipment, pricing, 
invoicing, and customer inquiry. The customer order performance cycle is completed 
through a series of information system transactions. 
The second level, management control, focuses on performance measurement and 
reporting. Performance measurement is necessary to provide feedback for supply 
chain contracts regarding performance and resource utilization. While some control 
measures, such as cost, are well defined, other measures, such as customer 
service and quality, are less specific. While internal measures are relatively easy to 
track, external measures are more difficult to obtain since they require monitoring 
performance regarding specific customers. 
The third level, decision analysis, focuses on software tools to assist supply chain 
partners in identifying, evaluating, and comparing strategic and tactical alternatives 
for improved contract effectiveness. Decision analysis should also include a 
centralized database and reporting over a wide range of potential logistics 
situations. Decision analysis applications are also being used to manage customer 
relationships by determining the trade-offs associated with having satisfied 
customers. Because decision analysis is used to guide future contracts, thus 
operations, users require more expertise and training to benefit from its capability. 
Finally, as we will develop in Chapter 6, strategic planning can be used to organize 
and synthesize transaction data into a wide range of business planning and decision 
making models that assist in evaluating the probabilities and payoffs of various 
strategies with the main focus on enhanced supply chain system integration.  
5.1.2 Communication Systems 
Information technology is also critical for information sharing to facilitate logistics 
and supply chain planning and operations. Historically, coordination of logistics has 
been difficult since logistics activities are often performed at locations distant from 
information technology hardware. As a result, information was not available at the 
location of essential work in terms of both time and content. The past decade has 
witnessed remarkable advances in logistical communication systems capability. EDI, 
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the Internet, Extensible Markup Language (XML), and satellite technology exist to 
facilitate communication between firms and facilities. Radio frequency allows short-
range communication within facilities such as warehouses. Image, bar coding, and 
scanner technologies allow communication between supply chain information 
systems and their physical environment. 
While further communication system improvement will continue to reduce 
uncertainty, it is likely that major opportunities for future performance enhancers will 
be through supply chain analysis and strategic planning systems, including supply 
chain contracts. 
5.2 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Execution Systems 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and execution systems are the major software 
components of logistical information systems [142-144]. ERP provides the central 
database and the transaction capability to initiate, track, monitor, and report on 
customer and replenishment orders to further refine supply chain contracts. ERP 
systems provide firms with information consistency, economies of scale, and 
integration.  
ERP system design includes the central database and application modules to 
facilitate supply chain, financial, and human resource management. Supply chain 
system design includes components for planning and coordination of operations and 
inventory deployment. 
 Enterprise execution systems provide the interface between the ERP and the day-
to-day operations with the customer, transportation, and the warehouse. On the 
other hand, Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems offer ‘insight 
regarding the firm’s activity level and performance with key customers. Benefits of 
within the context of supply chain contracts can be summarized as: 
• Quickened information response time, 
• Increased interaction across the supply chain, 
• Improved order management and order cycle, 
• Decreased financial close cycle, 
• Improved interaction with customers, 
• Improved on-time delivery, 
• Improved interaction with suppliers, 
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• Reduced direct operating costs, and 
• Lowered inventory levels. 
Gaining strategic advantage, the outcome of a successful supply chain contract, is 
listed as one of the top motivations to implement ERP systems [145, p: 5-7] 
5.2.1  Rationale for ERP Implementation 
Regardless the size of the firms in the supply chain, ERP investments are typically 
rationalized through three factors: consistency, economies of scale, and integration 
[130, p: 223]. 
The first major ERP objective is to create a system that utilizes consistent data and 
processes. In a typical application, the data is resident in a common data warehouse 
that can be accessed globally. In addition, the data can be modified with appropriate 
security and controls using transactions available in the supply chain. Transactions 
are initiated by specific supply chain activities and implemented using common 
assumptions and timing. Such a unified perspective offers supply chain partners a 
consistent integrated view. 
As firms merged and expanded, management made increasing demands to take 
advantage of global scale economies through resource utilization. ERP offers firms 
potential economies of scale in several ways. First, a single centralized processor or 
a network of decentralized processors with common configurations offers the 
potential for substantial procurement and maintenance scale economies. Second, 
the centralized ERP approach offers significant software scale economies since only 
a limited number of software licenses are necessary within the supply chain. Third, 
potential scale economies for ERP expertise exists since relatively few individuals 
have developed extensive skills. Finally, the centralized ERP approach increases 
the potential for shared resources and services. All those economies of scale can 
and should be factored into supply chain contracts. 
Integration results from a common integrated database and implementation of 
common processes. Typical common processes in ERP include order entry, order 
processing, warehouse management, invoicing, and accounting. Such integration 
also results in standard financial practices within the supply chain. A new generation 
of ERP systems, identified as ERP II, integrate traditional ERP along with a 
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system to better integrate the 
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requirements and expectations of key customers. ERPII is the external connectivity 
critical for supply chain collaboration. 
5.2.2  Enterprise Execution Systems 
ERP systems are substantially enhancing process and information consistency and 
integration of supply chain operations. Yet the focus on integrated processes has 
generally reduced the system functionality and features, particularly for operational 
elements such as warehouse and transportation management. The result is that 
ERP modules may not be capable of performing some of the major activities, 
particularly those focused on enhancing value required to support supply chain 
operations. Enterprise execution systems, including CRM, TMS, and WMS are 
evolving to meet these specific requirements as they are very important factors in 
successful supply chain contract implementations. 
5.2.2.1 Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
CRM is designed to extend the functionality of the ERP sales and delivery 
applications. Firms are using CRM to transition from treating customers as income 
sources to be exploited to treating as assets to be nurtured [137, p: 241]. While the 
traditional sales and delivery application was designed to accept customer orders in 
a wide range of formats and allow those orders to be managed throughout the 
fulfillment process, a broader range of capabilities is necessary to manage the 
customer relationship. Beyond this basic functionality, CRM requires sales tracking, 
sales history analysis, pricing management, promotion management, product mix 
management, and category management, all providing vital information for supply 
chain profitability and, implicitly, for supply chain contracts. For example, it is 
becoming more common for grocers to expect their suppliers to manage both the 
product mix and the shelf quantities for major product categories. This practice 
which can be factored in supply chain contracts requires substantial information 
support from the manufacturer but also facilitates information sharing. 
5.2.2.2 Transportation Management System (TMS) 
In general, the advanced TMS should proactively identify and evaluate alternative 
transportation strategies and tactics to determine the best methods to move product 
within the existing constraints. The principal deliverables of TMS are cost savings 
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and increased functionalities. Coupled with a supply chain contract, TMS can 
provide:  
• Order consolidation, 
• Route optimization, 
• Carrier rate management, 
• EDI links with carriers, 
• Internet-based shipment tracking, and 
• Integrated claims management. 
5.2.2.3 Warehouse Management System (WMS) 
Historical warehouse system functionality focused on receiving replenishment 
shipments, stock putaway, and order picking. Warehouses today must offer a 
broader range of services as they are frequently performing some light 
manufacturing. They also require managing more inventory on a just-in-time basis. 
Advanced WMS functionalities include: 
• Yard management, which refers to the process of managing the vehicles 
and the inventory within vehicles while in the warehouse yard, 
• Labor management to maximize the use of warehouse labor, 
• Warehouse optimization to select the best location within the warehouse 
for the storage and retrieval of products to minimize time and movement, 
• Value Added Services (VAS) to coordinate various warehouse activities 
to customize products, such as labelling, kitting, and setting up displays,  
• Planned cross-docking and merging, which refers to the integration of 
two parts of a customer order that have been supplied from a different 
source without maintaining inventory, and 
• Reverse logistics activities such as returns, repair, and recycling. 
5.3 Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) 
Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) systems work with ERP systems by 
providing business analysis and decision support capabilities. The majority of ERP 
systems are still transaction oriented and have limited decision support features. An 
APS system leverages the data residing in an ERP system to provide decision 
support for production planning, demand planning, and transportation planning [145, 
p: 96]. 
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Historically, logistics and supply chain planning processes were completed 
sequentially and independently. Each supply chain process developed both short 
and long term plans based on independent assumptions and constraints. The result, 
as we will see in Chapter 6 in the context of supply chain contracts, was inconsistent 
sourcing, production, inventory, warehousing, transportation, and pricing. The 
planning differences resulted in excess inventories, redundant capacity, and poor 
resource utilization. Capacity and inventory buffers were necessary to allow for the 
requirement inconsistencies resulting from independent plans. While this ineffective 
use of resources was once viewed as a part of business, such resources waste is 
not acceptable today. Enhanced performance requires increased planning 
integration across the supply chain processes. 
APS systems seek to integrate information and coordinate overall supply chain 
decisions while recognizing the dynamics between functions and processes. In a 
sense, supply chain contracts seek also the same objective while recognizing the 
dynamics between supply chain partners. 
5.3.1 Rationale for Advanced Planning and Scheduling 
The four factors driving APS development and implementation are planning horizon 
recognition, supply chain visibility, simultaneous resource consideration, and 
resource utilization [137, p: 249].  
5.3.1.1 Planning Horizon Recognition 
The first consideration is the movement to a shorter and shorter planning horizon for 
operations decisions. In the past, supply chain activities were planned months in 
advance with limited flexibility for change within the current timeframe. This lock-in 
time was often termed the freeze period for production and supply chain planning 
decisions. The reduced flexibility caused by external freeze periods resulted in poor 
customer service because production and shipping could not respond quickly or 
failure to respond to required changes would result in excess inventory. Supply 
chain contracts, especially supply chain quantity flexible contracts we will develop in 
Chapter 6, help accommodate these complex dynamics. This ability to 
accommodate change will then result to shorter planning cycles which, in turn, 
requires more comprehensive and effective planning tools. 
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5.3.1.2 Supply Chain Visibility 
The second consideration in APS development is the need for visibility regarding 
location and status of supply chain inventory and resources, a major component of 
the supply chain contracts. Visibility implies not only being able to track supply chain 
inventory and resources but also that information regarding available resources can 
be effectively evaluated and managed. However, simply being able to identify 
shipments and inventory is not sufficient; supply chain visibility requires exceptional 
coordination to highlight the need for resource or activity plans to minimize or 
prevent potential problems. Limited visibility regarding inventory in-transit and 
expected arrival times result to significant uncertainty regarding product availability. 
The model we develop in Chapter 7 incorporates the price sensitive demand into 
quantity flexible contracts and determines the optimal level of product availability. An 
effective APS system certainly integrates with information provided by other supply 
chain partners and provide the necessary visibility. 
5.3.1.3 Simultaneous Resource Consideration 
Once the planning system determines resource status and availability through 
visibility, the third APS consideration is the need to develop a plan that incorporates 
combined supply chain demand, capacity, material requirements, and constraints. 
The keyword here is the combined demand, the ultimate objective for supply chain 
contracts to maximize supply chain surplus. Quantity flexible supply chain contract 
requirements we develop in Chapter 7 reflect the price sensitive customer demand 
for product quantity, delivery timing, and location. While some of these customer 
requirements may be negotiable, logistics should execute to the agreed-to-
requirements and standards. 
The constraints to meeting customer requirements are materials, production, 
storage, and transportation capacity. These requirements represent the physical 
limitations of processes and facilities. Prior planning methods have typically 
considered these capacity constraints in a sequential manner. For example, an 
initial plan is made that operates within production constraints. The initial plan is 
then adjusted to reflect material and resource constraints. The second plan is then 
revised again to consider storage and transportation constraints. Achieving 
integrated supply chain performance requires simultaneous consideration of 
relevant supply chain capacity constraints to identify trade-offs where increased 
functional costs, such as in manufacturing or storage, might lead to lower overall 
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system costs. The APS system needs to quantitatively evaluate the trade-offs and 
suggest plans that can optimize overall supply chain performance. Supply chain 
contracts developed in Chapter 7 are targeted to evaluate these trade-offs 
quantitatively and simultaneously.   
5.3.1.4 Resource Utilization 
Logistics and supply chain management decisions have major influences on many 
enterprise resources, including production, distribution facilities and equipment, 
transportation equipment, and inventories. These resources consume a substantial 
proportion of a typical firm’s fixed and working assets. The typical result was long 
production runs and minimum setups and changeovers. However, longer production 
runs invariably result in more finished inventory, as substantial quantities are 
manufactured in anticipation of projected demand. More inventory increases working 
capital requirements while the additional space requirements increase. This trend 
toward more inventory is further aggravated by the increased uncertainty resulting 
from the need to forecast longer into the future. 
With functional resource trade-offs in mind, the final consideration driving APS 
system development and implementation is the need to implement an integrated 
planning approach that minimizes combined supply chain resources. This is a 
critical capability when supply chain performance place a strong emphasis on 
overall asset utilization to maximize supply chain surplus targeted with the supply 
chain contracts.  
5.3.2 Supply Chain APS Applications 
There are a growing number of APS applications. New applications are evolving by 
the need to consider a broader range of activities and resources within the scope of 
supply chain planning. There are, however, some applications that are typical for 
many supply chain planning environments [137, p: 249]. Within the supply chain 
contract context, these include demand planning, production planning, inventory and 
requirements planning, and transportation planning. 
5.3.2.1 Demand Planning 
The increasing complexity of product offerings and marketing tactics in conjunction 
with shorter product life cycles requires more accuracy, flexibility, and consistency in 
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determining inventory requirements. Demand planning APS systems attempt to 
provide such capabilities and should be utilized in supply chain contracts. 
Demand planning develops the forecast that drives anticipatory supply chain 
processes. The forecasts are the projections of monthly, weekly, or even daily 
demand that determine production and inventory requirements. Each projected 
quantity might include, based on supply chain price sensitive quantity flexible 
contracts developed in Chapter 7, some portion of future orders placed in 
anticipation of customer demand along with some portion of forecasted demand 
based on history. Essentially, the demand planning process integrates historically 
based forecasts with other information regarding events that could influence future 
sales activities (e.g., promotional plans, pricing changes, and new product 
introductions) to obtain the best possible integrated statement or requirements. 
Thus, price sensitive quantity flexible contracts, once again, can be the major 
drivers.  
Another aspect of the demand planning process focuses on creating forecast 
consistency across multiple products and distribution facilities. Effective integrated 
management requires accurate forecasts for each item and distribution facility. The 
aggregate and combined requirements should reflect a plan which is consistent with 
overall sales and financial projections anticipated in supply chain contracts. 
5.3.2.2 Production Planning 
Production planning uses the statement of requirements obtained from demand 
planning in conjunction with manufacturing resources and constraints to develop a 
workable manufacturing plan. The statement of requirements defines the items that 
need to be produced and the time they will be needed. The limitations occur in the 
form of facility equipment and labor availability. 
Production planning APS matches the requirements plan with the production and 
supply chain contracts constraints, the objective being to satisfy the necessary 
requirements at the minimum total production cost while not violating any 
constraints. Effective production planning results in a time sequenced plan to 
manufacture the correct items in a timely manner while operating within facility, 
equipment, labor, and contracts constraints. 
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5.3.2.3 Requirements Planning 
Requirements planning APS extends the planning process beyond the plant walls. 
While it is important to achieve economical plant performance, effective supply chain 
management requires consideration of the impact production decisions have on 
downstream performance. For example, production plan may suggest a long run of 
a single item. This will build up finished inventory requiring storage and transport 
capacity. While such long manufacturing runs might minimize manufacturing cost, 
overall system performance might be better served, within the supply chain 
contracts, with shorter runs resulting in less storage and transport requirements. The 
requirements planning APS uses evaluative techniques to trade-offs the costs of 
production, storage, and transportation for different supply chain contracts. The 
analysis attempts to satisfy customer demand, minimize overall cost, thus maximize 
overall supply chain surplus. 
5.3.2.4 Transportation Planning 
Another APS application focuses on transportation planning. Historically, purchasing 
and finished goods transportation both attempted to minimize their freight cost 
individually. Procurement minimized the expense of raw material movement by 
working with suppliers and inbound carriers. Logistics focused on minimizing 
outbound freight expense by working with customers and their transportation 
carriers. The individual perspectives of transportation often resulted in limited 
economies of scale, limited information sharing, and excessive transportation 
expenses. 
Transportation APS integrates transportation requirements, transportation 
resources, and relevant costs into a common tactical decision support system that 
seeks to minimize overall freight expense. The analysis suggests ways that freight, 
again within the supply chain contracts constraints, can be shifted among carriers or 
consolidated to achieve scale economies. It also facilitates information sharing 
within the supply chain to enable better asset utilization. 
5.3.3 APS System Components 
While there are many conceptual approaches to designing APS, the major 
components are fundamentally the same: demand management, resource 
management, resource optimization, and resource allocation [137, p: 255]. 
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5.3.3.1 Demand Management 
An APS demand management module develops the supply chain contract 
requirement projections for the planning horizon. In effect, it generates the sales 
forecasts based on sales history, currently scheduled orders, scheduled marketing 
activities, and customer information. It thus ideally works collaboratively and 
interactively both internally across the functional components of the organization 
and externally with supply chain partners to develop a common and consistent 
forecast for each time period, location, and item. The forecast should also 
incorporate feedback from customers to integrate the influence of combined demand 
generation activities such as advertising, promotion, and new product introduction. 
5.3.3.2 Resource Management 
APS resource management module coordinates and records supply chain system 
resources and constraints. Because APS systems use the resource and constraint 
information to evaluate the trade-offs associated with supply chain decisions, 
information accuracy and integrity are critical to provide optimal decisions required 
by the supply chain contracts and enhance planning system credibility. 
In addition to the requirements definition developed by the demand management 
module, APS requires product and customer definitions, resource definitions and 
costs, system constraints, and planning objective function. 
The product and customer definitions provide the constants regarding the products 
and customers to support the planning process. The product definitions provide the 
product descriptions and physical characteristics, such as weight and volume, 
standard costs, and bill of material. The customer definitions provide the ship to 
location and distribution assignments, along with special service requirements. The 
combination of both defines what is being manufactured, distributed, where it is 
being delivered, and the performance cycles involved in distribution. 
The resource definitions specify the physical resources used to accomplish supply 
chain activities such as manufacturing, storage, and movement. The resources 
include manufacturing equipment and process rates, storages facilities, and 
transportation equipment and availability. In addition to defining the existence of 
specific resources, the database must include the cost and performance 
characteristics and costs associated with resource usage. 
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System limitations define the major constraints limiting supply chain activities, 
including the capacity limitations associated with production, storage, and 
movement. Production capacity defines how much product can be manufactured 
within a specific time period and what are the trade-offs associated with making 
various quantity flexible products. Storage capacity defines the amount of product 
that can be stored in a specific facility. Movement capacity defines the volume of 
product that can be transported between facilities or to customers within a time 
period.  
The planning objective function defines criteria for developing a planning solution. 
Typical objective functions include minimizing total cost subject to meeting all 
requirements or minimizing the number of instances when capacity is exceeded. 
This combination of information provides the basis for the APS analysis. The module 
includes the database to store the definitions, resources, constraints, and objectives 
as well as the processes to effectively validate and maintain integrated, accurate 
and consistent data.  
5.3.3.3 Resource Optimization 
The resource optimization module is the computational engine of any APS system. 
Using the requirements from the demand management module and the definitions, 
resources, limitations, and objectives from the resource management module, 
resource optimization uses a combination of mathematical programming and 
heuristics to determine how to best meet customer requirements while utilizing 
resources most effectively. The resource optimization module also determines when 
requirements cannot be met and which resources are the most limiting on supply 
chain performance. The resource optimization module output is a supply chain plan 
projected into future time periods that minimizes overall costs while attempting to 
operate within major constraints. The plan specifies which products should be 
produced when and where and determines movement and storage requirements 
across the supply chain. 
The resource optimization module can also be used to conduct sensitivity or what-if 
analysis, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 7, to determine the impact of changes in 
market requirements or assumptions as well as in supply chain contracts. These 
analyses allow the supply chain planner to isolate the impact of demand and 
performance uncertainty on supply chain capabilities and operations imposed by 
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price sensitive quantity flexible contracts. Using the insight regarding the trade-offs 
and the impact of uncertainty, the APS resource optimization module guides the 
planners in establishing the most effective supply chain contracts. 
5.3.3.4 Resource Allocation 
APS resource allocation module refines the resource assignments and 
communicates with the ERP module to initiate appropriate transactions. The results 
include requirements for procurement, production, storage, and transport. Figure 5.1 
[137, p: 255] illustrates how APS modules relate to each other and to the ERP or 
legacy system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The resource allocation module also provides information regarding when products 
are available to promise (ATP) or capable to promise (CTP). ATP is used to 
designate that even though actual inventory is not currently available, it will be 
available for shipment at a specific date in the future. In effect, the ATP designation 
allows firms to commit scheduled production to customers. CTP is used to designate 
when requested product can be promised for future delivery. CTP requires a much 
broader analysis as it determines whether there is future specific capacity or 
capability, given current and projected supply chain demands, and therefore should 
be used in any supply chain quantity flexible contracts. 
5.3.4 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) 
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) is a process 
initiated by the customer products industry to achieve coordination through the 
supply chain and is an integral part of any supply chain contract. In essence, CPFR 
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coordinates the requirements plan for the demand creation and demand fulfillment 
activities. The CPFR solution shares information involving promotions, forecasts, 
item data, and orders with trading partners. The collaboratively developed 
information is then used jointly and iteratively  by planners to generate demand, 
determine replenishment requirements, match production to demands, and refine 
supply chain contracts. 
The first step in the CPFR process is joint business planning wherein a retailer and 
supplier share, discuss, coordinate, and rationalize their own individual strategies to 
create a partnership strategy, thus a supply chain contract. A common sales 
forecast is created and shared between retailer and supplier based on shared 
knowledge. CPFR includes an iterative process until a consensus is reached. In 
Chapter 7, we also developed profit sharing solutions related to the sharing of the 
additional supply chain profit thus generated. Using this consensus forecast, 
production, replenishment, and shipment plans are developed. The forecast 
becomes a commitment by the trading partners in terms of supply chain contracts. 
Besides, these alliances and partnerships create long term relationships between 
supply chain partners. Figure 5.2 [137, p: 271] illustrates base CPFR relationships 
within the supply chain. 
 
Supplier 
Promotions 
Forecasts 
Item 
Catalog 
Orders 
EDI 
Internet 
CPFR Solution 
Trading 
Partner 
Trading 
Partner 
Trading  
Partner 
Collaborate 
CRM 
APS 
ERP 
Generate 
demand 
Determine 
rqmts 
Make to 
demand 
Figure 5.2: CPFR 
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment 
  64 
5.3.5 APS Benefits and Considerations within the Supply Chain Contracts 
Context 
From a supply chain contracts point of view, especially for the price sensitive 
quantity flexible model we developed in Chapter 7, there are three broad benefits 
that accrue from APS utilization. These include responsiveness to changes, 
comprehensive perspective, and resource utilization.  
Historically, logistics and supply chain managers have used extended lead times 
and schedule freezes to plan for future supply chain activity. The long lead times 
and freeze periods were necessary since the planning process was complex and 
required substantial analyses. The plans had to be defined early and then frozen to 
allow the firm time to execute them. While this approach reduced uncertainty, it also 
substantially reduced flexibility and responsiveness, thus reducing the supply chain 
surplus.  
Today’s customers requires more responsiveness to market needs, and demand for 
lower  inventory levels rules out long cycle times. Marketplace and firm changes can 
be quickly made in the demand management and resource management modules, 
allowing for the planning process to use the most current and accurate information. 
The requirements optimization module, where the model we developed in Chapter 7 
can be part of, then solves the allocation, allowing short term planning cycles rather 
than long term. APS thus results in a planning process that can be much more 
responsive to marketplace or firm changes. 
Second, effective supply chain management requires planning and coordination 
across the supply chain. The process must consider the trade-offs associated with 
shifting activities, resources, and inventories across organizations. Such a 
comprehensive perspective increases planning process complexity substantially. 
The complexity follows from the number of organizations, facilities, products, and 
assets that must be considered when coordinating activities and resources across 
an entire supply chain. APS offers the capability to consider a comprehensive 
perspective and make the appropriate trade-offs to achieve optimal supply chain 
performance.  
Third, APS typically results in substantial supply chain performance improvements in 
line with the main objective of maximizing the supply chain performance of supply 
chain contracts. While more comprehensive planning and reduced uncertainty 
usually result in improved customer service, the major APS benefit is enhanced 
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resource utilization and common objectives. More effective and responsive planning 
allows a more even assignment of requirements to existing sourcing, production, 
storage, and transportation capacity. The result is that existing capacity is used 
more effectively within the supply chain contracts constraints. APS can also 
significantly reduce asset requirements by smoothing resource demands. The 
decreases include reductions in plant, equipment, facilities, and inventory.  
While comprehensive APS is a relatively new capability, the future outlook is bright 
as the technology and capacity to effectively evaluate and manage integrated supply 
chains are developed. APS can take a comprehensive and dynamic perspective of 
the entire supply chain and focus on maximizing the supply chain surplus. Thus, it is 
our belief that the models we developed in Chapter 7 can and should be an integral 
part of any APS system.  
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CHAPTER 6. SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS AND COMMITTED DELIVERY 
STRATEGIES 
The strategic fit requires that a company achieve the balance between 
responsiveness and efficiency in its supply chain that best meets the needs of the 
company’s competitive strategy. The drivers of supply chain performance not only 
determine its performance in terms of responsiveness and efficiency, they also 
determine whether strategic fit is achieved across the supply chain. In Chapter 4, we 
analyzed the impact of inventory, transportation, facilities, and information as the 
drivers of supply chain performance.  In this chapter, we will analyze supply chain 
contracts and their role in maximizing the total supply chain surplus. 
Contracts specify the parameters within which a buyer places orders and a supplier 
fulfills them. By entering into such a contract, the buyer often stands to gain 
guaranteed delivery of the product, which is very useful in times of scarcity, shorter 
delivery times, lower purchasing price, or a lower safety stock level. The supplier will 
also benefit with a better production plan, reduced variance of demand, economies 
of scale, or less paperwork. Harder to measure, but also important, is the increased 
level of trust and cooperation which can develop between a buyer and a supplier 
who decide to engage in such a contract.  
Of particular interest here are contracts that will maximize the total supply chain 
surplus.  
For simplicity, our supply chain consists of a single manufacturer, a single retailer, 
and customers. Transportation costs are included in the wholesale price of the 
product, which is assumed at maturity phase of its product life cycle with a normally 
distributed constant/horizontal demand pattern. The models can be extended to 
more complex supply chains, and/or different demand patterns at different phases of 
the product’s life cycle. 
This chapter is organized as follows: 
In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we consider a commitment model for a retailer facing price-
sensitive demand and given the opportunity to receive a discount on committed 
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deliveries by using a standard economic model addressed by Lau and Lau [65] and 
Thomas [67] that can be viewed as a newsvendor style model. The strength of the 
model is the inclusion of demand as a function of the selling price. However, the 
model is restricted with the intracompany scope maximizing only the retailer’s profit 
without taking into account the total supply chain profit.  
In Sections 6.3 to 6.6, we address this weakness of intracompany approach by 
introducing the total supply chain surplus with intercompany view, which requires 
that both the manufacturer and the retailer evaluate their actions in the context of 
the entire supply chain using buyback and quantity flexibility contracts modeled by 
Chopra and Meindl [2]. The strength of this model is that both buyback and quantity 
flexibility contracts help increase the total supply chain profit. However, there are 
two issues that need to be addressed. The first one is related to profit sharing, i.e., 
how to share the additional supply chain surplus thus generated. The second issue, 
the main weakness of the contracts discussed, is the fact that demand has not been 
correlated to the selling price. 
We have used Excel Statistical Functions to evaluate normal distribution functions 
used in our numerical experiments. These functions, described in Appendix A, are 
then used in a computer program we compiled to find optimum contract parameters 
for the model we develop in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Retailer Profit without Commitment Opportunity with Demand as a 
Function of the Selling Price 
Without the opportunity to obtain a discount for commitment, a retailer will seek to 
maximize its expected profit pi(p) where p is the selling price set by the retailer, c is 
the total unit cost (including transportation) and µ(p) is the expected demand as a 
function of the selling price. It is assumed that a lower price generates greater 
demand so that µ’(p) < 0 and there is no fixed ordering cost. Furthermore, it is also 
assumed that the retailer can order any quantity any time during the horizon and 
there is no lead time for delivery. The retailer seeks to maximize its expected profit: 
maxp pi(p) = (p - c) µ(p)                  (6.1) 
Demand functions considered are linear (6.2) and constant elasticity (6.3) demand 
functions shown in Figure 6.1 [67]. 
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µ(p) = d(a – p) / b : a – b ≤ p ≤ a              (6.2) 
µ(p) = dp-ε  : p ≥ 0,  ε > 1              (6.3) 
For the linear form, d is a scale value representing the size of the market. For p in 
the specified range, (a – p) / b will be between zero and one and represents the 
retailer’s market share. The elasticity of demand measures the percentage increase 
in demand for a 1% increase in price and is formally defined as: 
εµ(p) =  pµ’(p) / µ(p)                  (6.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let m to be the percentage markup, p = c(1 + m). Then, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a unique optimal price can be characterized in terms of the 
markup m and the elasticity εµ [c(1 + m)]. The first order optimality condition implies 
that µ(p*) + (p* - c) µ’(p*) = 0, which after algebraic manipulations becomes [67]: 
(1 + m*) / m* = - εµ [c(1 + m*)]              (6.5) 
For a constant elasticity mean demand function, the right hand side of Equation 
(6.5) is a constant greater than 1. For any constant elasticity mean demand function 
there is a unique optimal price. For general demand functions, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a unique optimal price is that the elasticity, as a function of 
the markup, is bounded and crosses the function f(m) = (1  + m) / m only once. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Linear and Constant Elasticity Demand Functions  
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This necessary and sufficient condition is graphically represented in Figure 6.2 [67] 
for both a constant elasticity mean demand function and a linear mean demand 
function that satisfies the condition for a unique optimal price.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The optimal prices, markups, and corresponding profits for the mean demand 
functions are shown in Table 6.1 [67]. For the two demand functions considered 
here, it is clear that a reduction in the unit cost results in a reduction in the optimal 
price. In other words, a reduction in cost cannot result in an increase in the optimal 
price for any non-increasing expected demand function. 
Table 6.1: Optimal Prices and Profits 
µ(p) p* m* pi* 
dp-ε cε / (ε – 1) 1 / (ε – 1) (d/ε) [cε / (ε –1)]1-ε 
d(a – p) / b (a + c) / 2 [(a + c) / 2c] - 1 d(a – c)2 / 4b 
As it can also be observed from Table 6.2, when there is no reduction in unit cost, 
the optimal price and profit remains the same for a linear elasticity function. The 
same is also true for a constant elasticity function. Therefore, there may not be any 
incentive for the retailer to increase the demand by decreasing the selling price. This 
is the main weakness of the model since it is restricted with the Intracompany 
Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Company Profit View.  
 
Figure 6.2: Conditions for Unique Optimal Price  
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Table 6.2: Optimal Prices and Profits 
d = 1500, a = 300, b = 150, c = 100 
p 
($) 
c 
($) 
 
µ(p) 
 
p* 
($) 
 
m* 
 
pi* 
($) 
180 100 1,200 200 1.00 100,000 
190 100 1,100 200 1.00 100,000 
200 100 1,000 200 1.00 100,000 
210 100 900 200 1.00 100,000 
220 100 800 200 1.00 100,000 
In order to maximize the supply chain surplus, Intercompany Interfunctional Scope: 
The Maximize Supply Chain Surplus View needs to be implemented. Table 6.3 
shows the effect of reduction in unit cost on retailer’s optimal prices and profits for 
the same demand level. Although not shown explicitly in the table, it is clear that the 
manufacturer can increase/decrease its own profit by decreasing/increasing the unit 
price it charges to the retailer. The question is how to balance retailer’s and 
manufacturer’s profits in order to achieve maximum supply chain surplus. 
Committed deliveries can help achieve this objective. 
Table 6.3: Optimal Prices and Profits 
d = 1500, a = 300, b = 150, p = 200 
p 
($) 
c 
($) 
 
µ(p) 
 
p* 
($) 
 
m* 
 
pi* 
($) 
200 80 1,000 190 1.38 121,000 
200 90 1,000 195 1.17 110,250 
200 100 1,000 200 1.00 100,000 
200 110 1,000 205 0.86 90,250 
200 120 1,000 210 0.75 81,000 
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6.2  Retailer Profit with Commitment Opportunity with Demand as a 
Function of the Selling Price 
As discussed in Section 6.1, without the opportunity to obtain a discount for 
commitment, a retailer will seek to maximize its expected profit pi(p) where p is the 
selling price set by the retailer, c is the total unit cost (including transportation) and 
µ(p) is the expected demand as a function of the selling price. We now return back 
to analyze the impact of committing periodic deliveries over some finite horizon. 
By accepting periodic deliveries, the retailer permits the manufacturer and 
transportation provider to efficiently utilize their resources. In exchange for 
absorbing this variability, the manufacturer offers a percentage discount δ for these 
committed deliveries. The manufacturer and the retailer jointly choose a total 
commitment quantity Q at unit cost c(1 - δ). The retailer may still place supplemental 
orders at any time during the horizon at unit cost c. We assume that both committed 
supply and demand occur at a constant rate during the horizon.  
Let (x)+ = max(x, 0). Under the constant rate assumption, the number of 
supplemental orders is equal to the demand minus committed supply (D - Q)+, and 
the average inventory is equal to committed supply minus demand divided by two, 
(Q - D)+ / 2. Furthermore, let h’ be the fractional holding cost rate and s the fractional 
salvage value. If follows that the understock cost is the supplemental ordering cost δ 
and the overstock cost is h = (h’/2) + (c – s).  
Using fs( ) as the standard normal density function and Fs( ) as the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function for demand, the retailer seeks to maximize its 
expected profit: 
maxp pi(p) = [p – c(1- δ)] µ(p) – c(δ + h) fs[Fs-1[δ /(δ +h)]] σ(p) 
Let k(p) = σ(p) / µ(p) denote the coefficient of variation of demand. Furthermore, let 
δ’(p) = δ - (δ + h) Fs-1[δ /(δ +h)] k(p). This term can be viewed as effective discount 
which incorporates the fact that while some units are purchased at the reduced price 
c(1 - δ), some will still be purchased at the regular price c.  
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Therefore, Equation (6.1) where, without the opportunity to obtain a discount for 
commitment, a retailer seeks to maximize its expected profit pi(p): 
maxp pi(p) = (p - c) µ(p) 
can be written with commitment opportunity as [67]: 
 maxp pi(p) = [p – c[1 – δ’(p)]] µ(p)              (6.6) 
As it can be observed, commitment will increase expected overstock costs since 
flexibility in ordering is reduced, in other words, δ’(p) < δ. Also, the effective per unit 
cost falls out even though the discount δ is only given on committed purchases. 
Either δ’ > 0 or the retailer is better off not committing. 
Commitment strategies can offer market opportunities by contributing to the profit 
improvement in two ways: reduction in effective unit cost and improved pricing. 
However, it is still restricted with the Intracompany Interfunctional Scope: The 
Maximize Company Profit View. 
6.2.1  Pricing and Profit Implications of Committed Delivery Strategies 
In this section, commitment and pricing decisions associated with different 
committed delivery strategies are compared [67]. Constant elasticity expected 
demand function µ(p) = dp-ε  with coefficient of variation = 0.3 is used in 
calculations performed using Excel. Two cases are considered. In the first case, it is 
assumed that the units are fully salvageable at the discounted unit cost s = c(1 - δ) 
and that the fractional holding cost rate is h’ = 0.10. Second case is for s = 0.80, and 
h’ = 0.10. Figure 6.3 shows the standard commitment level z as a function of δ 
where z denotes the optimal fractile of demand, z = Fs-1[δ /(δ +h)]. 
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Figure 6.4 shows the effective discounts at the z-value for the same two cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Retailer Profit without Commitment Opportunity with Normally 
Distributed Demand 
Again, without the opportunity to obtain a discount for commitment and given that 
there is a lead time for delivery, the retailer will seek to evaluate its level of product 
availability in terms of optimal order size that maximizes profit. Here we first assume 
that the demand is a continuous non-negative random variable with density function 
f(x) and cumulative distribution function F(x). We will then analyze the specific case 
where x is normally distributed with a mean µ and standard deviation σ. 
Furthermore, let p the selling price, c the total unit cost, and s the salvage value for 
unsold units. 
 
Figure 6.3: Standardized Commitment Levels  
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Assume that Q units are purchased and a demand of x units arises. If Q < x, all Q 
units are sold and a profit of Q(p – c) results. However, if Q > x, only x units are sold 
and a profit of x(p – c) – (Q – x)(c – s) results. The expected profit pi(Q) is given as: 
 
 
pi(Q) =        [x(p - c) – (Q - x)(c - s)]  f(x) dx +       [Q(p - c)] f(x) dx                    (6.7) 
 
To determine the value of Q that maximizes pi(Q): 
dpi(Q) / dQ = -(c – s)    f(x) dx  + (p – c)   f(x) dx  = (p - c) [1 - F(Q)] - (c - s) F(Q) = 0 
This implies an optimal order size Q* where [2, p: 252]:  
F(Q*) = (p - c) / [(p - c) + (c - s)]                       (6.8) 
Up to this point, we assumed that the demand is a continuous non-negative random 
variable with density function f(x) and cumulative distribution function F(x). We will 
now drive expected profit from an order as well as expected overstock and expected 
understock assuming that demand is normally distributed with a mean µ and 
standard deviation σ.  
6.3.1  Expected Profit from an Order 
Equation (6.7) can be written as [2, p: 253]: 
pi(Q) =        [(p - s)x – Q(c - s)]  f(x) dx +       [Q(p - c)] f(x) dx 
Substituting for normal distribution with where fs( ) is the standard normal density 
function and Fs( ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, the 
expected profit pi(Q) becomes: 
 pi(Q) = (p - s) µ Fs[(Q - µ) / σ] - (p – s) σ fs [(Q - µ) / σ] - 
       Q(c - s) F(Q, µ, σ) + Q(p - c) [1 - F(Q, µ, σ)]            (6.9)  
∫
0
Q
∫
Q
∞
∫
0
Q
∫
Q
∞
∫
x = - ∞
Q
∫
x = Q
∞
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6.3.2  Expected Overstock from an Order 
If Q units are ordered, an overstock results only if demand x < Q. We thus, for a 
normally distributed demand, have [2, p: 254]: 
Expected overstock = QFs[(Q - µ) / σ] - µ Fs[(Q - µ) / σ] + σ fs [(Q - µ) / σ]  
which, after algebraic manipulations becomes: 
Expected overstock = (Q – µ) Fs[(Q - µ) / σ] + σ fs[(Q - µ) / σ]         (6.10)  
6.3.3  Expected Understock from an Order 
If Q units are ordered, an understock results only if demand x > Q. We thus, for a 
normally distributed demand, have [2, p: 255]: 
Expected understock = (µ  - Q) + QFs[(Q - µ) / σ] - µ Fs[(Q - µ) / σ] + σ fs[(Q - µ) / σ]  
which, after algebraic manipulations becomes: 
Expected understock = (µ - Q) [ 1 - Fs[(Q - µ) / σ] ] + σ fs[(Q - µ) / σ]               (6.11)  
6.4  Supply Chain Surplus 
In sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 we have seen how to maximize the retailer profit in 
isolation from the rest of the supply chain, i.e., within the Intracompany 
Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Company Profit View. The Intracompany 
Interfunctional scope leads to each stage of the supply chain trying to maximize its 
own profits, which does not necessarily result in the maximization of supply chain 
surplus. Supply chain surplus is maximized only when all supply chain stages 
coordinate strategy together [146-152]. 
Consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. To simplify 
the discussion, assume that the product is seasonal and exclusively sold through 
the retailer. Each product costs v = $10 to produce, including transportation, and the 
manufacturer plans to charge a wholesale price c = $100 per unit. The retailer plans 
to sell the product for a price p = $200. At this price, the retailer estimates the 
demand to be normally distributed with a mean of µ = 1,000 and a standard 
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deviation of σ = 300. Also assume that the retailer is unable to salvage anything for 
unsold products, resulting in a salvage value of s = $0. 
Using Equation (6.8), the retailer finds it optimal to order 1,000 units. Equation (6.9) 
evaluates expected profit to be $76,063. In this case, the manufacturer sells 1,000 
units for a total profit of $90,000. Therefore, the total expected supply chain profit is 
$166,063.  
Now consider the intercompany view which requires that each company evaluate its 
actions in the context of the entire supply chain. The supply chain makes $190 for 
each unit of product sold. From the perspective of the entire supply chain, the cost 
of understocking is $190 and the cost of overstocking is $10. It is thus optimal for 
the supply chain, using the same equations, to produce 1,493 units resulting in a 
total expected supply chain profit of $183,812. 
The gap in profit exists because of double marginalization. Each party makes 
decisions considering only a portion of the total supply chain [2, p: 243].    
6.5  Buyback Contracts 
We next consider how the manufacturer can offer buyback contracts to induce the 
retailer to order quantities that increase the total supply chain profit. A manufacturer 
can increase the quantity the retailer purchases by offering to buy back any leftover 
units at the end of the season at a fraction of the purchase price. The action has the 
effect of increasing the salvage value per unit for the retailer who, as a result, 
increases its order size. The manufacturer may benefit by taking on some of the 
cost of overstocking because the supply chain will, on average, end up selling more 
products [153, 154]. 
In a buyback contract, the manufacturer specifies a wholesale price c along with a 
buyback price b at which retailer can return any unsold units. In this scenario, the 
salvage value for the retailer becomes s = b and the manufacturer has also a 
different salvage value w for the units returned from the retailer [2, p: 243-244]. 
Again, the optimal order quantity and the expected retailer profit can be evaluated 
using Equations (6.8) and (6.9) where the salvage value for the retailer is  s = b and 
the salvage value for the manufacturer is nil. The expected profit at the 
manufacturer depends on the overstock at the retailer evaluated using Equation 
(6.10) and can be expressed as: 
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Expected manufacturing profit = Q* (c - v) - b(expected overstock at retailer) 
Table 6.4 provides the outcome obtained using Excel for different buyback contracts 
that the manufacturer offers the retailer. Again, each product costs v = $10 to 
produce and the sale price p of a unit of product is $200. Demand at this price is 
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of µ = 1,000 and a standard 
deviation of σ = 300. At this stage, we also assume that there is no transportation or 
other cost associated with any returns. Table 6.4 shows that a buyback contract 
allows both the manufacturer and the retailer to increase their profits by increasing 
total supply chain profits by about 10%. In many instances, buyback contracts can 
be used to increase total supply chain profit. In general, it is optimal for the 
manufacturer to offer to buy back at a fraction of the wholesale price. An alternative 
way to buyback contracts is the use of holding cost subsidies [155-157] where 
manufacturers pay retailers a certain amount for every unit held in inventory. 
Table 6.4: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer 
Under Different Buyback Contracts 
Wholesale 
Price 
($) 
Buyback 
Price 
($) 
Optimal 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Returns 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
100 0 1,000 76,063 120 90,000 166,063 
100 30 1,067 80,154 156 91,338 171,492 
100 60 1,170 85,724 223 91,886 177,610 
100 95 1,501 96,875 506 86,935 183,810 
110 50 1,076 72,615 162 99,525 172,140 
110 100 1,384 84,735 399 98,580 183,315 
110 105 1,486 86,938 493 96,872 183,810 
120 75 1,108 65,971 181 108,250 174,220 
120 100 1,252 71,601 286 109,176 180,777 
120 116 1,501 77,500 506 106,310 183,810 
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From Table 6.4, it can also be observed that increasing the buyback price always 
increases retailer profits and may also increase manufacturer profits. Also, the 
manufacturers can increase their profits by increasing the buyback price by a larger 
amount than they increase the wholesale price. As an example, the manufacturer 
makes a higher profit with a wholesale price of $110 and a buyback price of $100 
than it does with a wholesale price of $100 and a buyback price of $60. 
It can also be observed that as the wholesale price increases, it is optimal for the 
manufacturer to increase the buyback price as well. Another observation is that for a 
fixed wholesale price, as the buyback price increases, the retailer orders more and 
also returns more. Consequently, as the cost associated with returns increases, 
buyback contracts become less attractive because the cost of returns reduces 
supply chain profits. In this situation, holding cost subsidies can be used as an 
alternative to buyback contracts with similar outcomes. 
6.6  Quantity Flexibility Contracts 
In quantity flexibility contracts, the manufacturer allows the retailer to change the 
quantity ordered after observing demand. If a retailer orders Q units, the 
manufacturer commits to providing Q+ = (1 + α)Q units, and the retailer is committed 
to buying at least Q- = (1 - β)Q units. Both α and β are between 0 and 1. The retailer 
can purchase up to Q+ units depending on the demand observed. These contracts 
are similar to buyback contracts in that the manufacturer now bears some of the risk 
of having excess inventory. Because no returns are required, these contracts can be 
more effective than buyback contracts when the cost of returns is high. Quantity 
flexibility contracts increase the average amount the retailer purchases and may 
increase total supply chain profits [2, p: 245-246].  
As in previous discussions, let v the unit production cost, c the unit wholesale price, 
p the unit selling price, s the retailer salvage value, and w the manufacturer salvage 
value. The manufacturer produces Q+ units and the retailer purchases Q- units if 
demand D is less than Q-, D units if demand D is between Q- and Q+, and Q+ units if 
demand D is greater than Q+. We thus obtain: 
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Expected quantity purchased by retailer: 
Q = Q- F(Q- ) + Q+ [1 - F(Q+ )] + µ [ Fs[(Q+ - µ) / σ] - Fs[(Q- - µ) / σ]] - 
              σ [ fs[(Q+ - µ) / σ] -  fs[(Q- - µ) / σ]]         (6.12) 
Expected quantity sold by retailer: 
D = Q+ [1 - F(Q+ )]  + µ Fs[(Q+ - µ) / σ] - σ fs[(Q+ - µ) / σ]          (6.13) 
Expected overstock at manufacturer = Q – D           (6.14) 
Expected retailer profit = pD + s(Q – D) – cQ           (6.15)  
Expected manufacturer profit = cQ + w(Q+- Q) -vQ+            (6.16) 
Based on the same figures as in the previous examples and using Excel, Table 6.5 
provides the impact of different quantity flexibility contracts on supply chain 
profitability. All contracts considered are such that the salvage value is nil at both the 
manufacturer and the retailer and that α = β. 
From Table 6.5 we can observe that quantity flexibility contracts allow both the 
manufacturer and the retailer to increase their profits. It is often in the 
manufacturer’s best interest to offer a quantity flexibility contract to the retailer. As 
an example, for the wholesale price of $100, the manufacturer increases its own 
profits by offering a quantity flexibility contract where α and β are equal to 0.2. Total 
supply chain profits also increase with quantity flexibility. As the manufacturer 
increases the wholesale price, it is optimal to offer greater quantity flexibility to the 
retailer.  
Vendor-managed Inventories (VMI) is another approach to move the control of the 
replenishment decision from the retailer to the manufacturer. VMI can allow a 
manufacturer to increase its profits as well as profits for the entire supply chain by 
mitigating some of the effects of double marginalization. 
 
. 
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Table 6.5: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer 
Under Different Quantity Flexibility Contracts 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0 0 100 1,000 1,000 880 76,063 90,000 166,063 
0.2 0.2 100 900 944 916 88,775 83,642 172,417 
0.2 0.2 100 1,000 1,000 955 90,933 88,000 178,933 
0.2 0.2 100 1,100 1,047 978 90,889 91,515 182,404 
0.4 0.4 100 1,000 1,000 987 97,456 86,000 183,456 
0.6 0.6 100 1,000 1,000 997 99,491 84,000 183,491 
0.7 0.7 100 1,000 1,000 999 99,801 83,000 182,801 
0.2 0.2 110 1,000 1,000 955 80,933 98,000 178,933 
0.4 0.4 110 1,000 1,000 987 87,456 96,000 183,456 
0.5 0.5 110 1,000 1,000 994 88,810 95,000 183,810 
0.2 0.2 120 1,000 1,000 955 70,933 108,000 178,933 
0.4 0.4 120 1,000 1,000 987 77,456 106,000 183,456 
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CHAPTER 7. PROPOSED SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACT MODEL 
Both buyback and quantity flexibility contracts help increase the total supply chain 
profit. However, there are two issues that need to be addressed. The first one is 
related to profit sharing, i.e., how to share the additional supply chain surplus thus 
generated. The second issue, the main weakness of the contracts discussed, is the 
fact that demand has not been correlated to the selling price. In this chapter we 
develop “Maximize Supply Chain Profit with Buyback and Quantity Flexibility 
Contracts and Profit Sharing with Demand as a Function of the Selling Price Model” 
to address these issues. 
This chapter is organized as follows: 
In Section 7.1, we analyze and then propose two solutions to address the issue of 
profit sharing for quantity flexibility contracts. 
In Section 7.2, we develop a model to address the individual weaknesses of the 
models discussed by incorporating the price-sensitive demand into quantity flexibility 
contracts to maximize the total supply chain profit: Committed Deliveries using 
Quantity Flexibility Contracts to Maximize Supply Chain Surplus with Demand as a 
Function of the Selling Price.  
In Section 7.3, we also develop a computer program to help simulate the system to 
find optimum contract parameters for the proposed supply chain contract model. 
The program is given in Appendix B. 
Finally, in Section 7.4, we compare the existing and proposed models and 
emphasize the benefits of using the supply chain contracts with a price-sensitive 
demand function and profit sharing as a supply chain performance driver.   
7.1 Profit Sharing while Maximizing the Supply Chain Surplus  
Table 7.1 partially duplicates Table 6.5 for cases where the wholesale price and 
order size are kept constant. As we previously observed, quantity flexibility contracts 
allow both the manufacturer and the retailer to increase their profits by increasing 
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the total supply chain surplus. However, the values of α and β which maximize the 
expected supply chain profit may have an adverse affect on either the manufacturer 
or the retailer. As it can be observed from Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1, a quantity 
flexibility contract with α and β = 0.6 increases the total expected supply chain profit 
by more than 10%. However, the manufacturer’s profit actually decreases by 
roughly 7% due to a much higher retailer’s profit increase of 30%.    
Table 7.1: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Constant Wholesale Price and Order Size 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0 0 100 1,000 1,000 880 76,063 90,000 166,063 
0.2 0.2 100 1,000 1,000 955 90,933 88,000 178,933 
0.4 0.4 100 1,000 1,000 987 97,456 86,000 183,456 
0.6 0.6 100 1,000 1,000 997 99,491 84,000 183,491 
0.7 0.7 100 1,000 1,000 999 99,801 83,000 182,801 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will analyze and then evaluate two solutions to address this issue of profit 
sharing for quantity flexibility contracts. Our first solution will use β as the profit 
sharing parameter whereas the second solution involves the wholesale unit price the 
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manufacturer charges the retailer. In both cases, the selling price of the product and 
order size are kept constant. 
7.1.1 Profit Sharing with β as a Parameter 
As discussed, in quantity flexibility contracts, the manufacturer allows the retailer to 
change the quantity ordered after observing demand. If a retailer orders Q units, the 
manufacturer commits to providing Q+ = (1 + α)Q units, and the retailer is committed 
to buying at least Q- = (1 - β)Q units. Both α and β are between 0 and 1. The retailer 
can purchase up to Q+ units depending on the demand observed. Quantity flexibility 
contracts increase the average amount the retailer purchases and may increase 
total supply chain profits. All contracts considered are such that the salvage value is 
nil at both the manufacturer and the retailer. 
Since the expected quantity sold by retailer is a function of α (Equation (6.13) 
whereas the expected quantity purchased by retailer is a function of both α and β 
(Equation (6.12), we can move the unsold units inventory from manufacturer to 
retailer by decreasing β while keeping α constant to guarantee the same total 
expected supply chain profit. Similarly, increasing β will move the unsold units from 
retailer to manufacturer. Therefore, using β as a parameter, the expected supply 
chain profit can be redistributed between the manufacturer and the retailer.  
Table 7.2, generated using Excel, and Figure 7.2 show the impact of using β as a 
parameter on the distribution of the total expected supply chain profit. Setting α = 
0.6 and β = 0.1 will approximately redistribute the profit evenly between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. Similar approach can be used to distribute only the 
additional supply chain profit generated by using the quantity flexibility contract 
rather than distributing the total supply chain profit. The manufacturer can even 
guarantee a certain profit level to the retailer in exchange of freely setting β, i.e., 
moving the unsold units to the retailer. Finally, we assumed that all contracts 
considered are such that the salvage value is nil at both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. If the salvage value is different at both ends, then it has to be incorporated 
accordingly. 
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Table 7.2: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
β as Profit Sharing Parameter 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.6 0.6 100 1,000 1,000 997 99,491 84,000 183,491 
0.6 0.4 100 1,000 1,010 997 98,473 85,017 183,491 
0.6 0.2 100 1,000 1,043 997 95,212 88,279 183,491 
0.6 0.1 100 1,000 1,074 997 92,118 91,372 183,491 
0.6 0 100 1,000 1,117 997 87,777 95,714 183,491 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Profit Sharing with Wholesale Price as a Parameter 
The use of wholesale price as a parameter can also achieve the same profit sharing 
objective in a similar way. Wholesale price, being an internal parameter within the 
manufacturing and/or replenishment cycle of the supply chain, has no effect on the 
total expected supply chain profit. It merely redistributes the total supply chain 
surplus between the manufacturer and the retailer. Table 7.3, generated using 
Excel, and Figure 7.3 show the impact of using the wholesale price as a parameter 
on the distribution of the total expected supply chain profit. Setting the wholesale 
price around $108 will approximately redistribute the profit evenly between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. Again, similar approach can be used to distribute only 
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the additional supply chain profit generated by using the quantity flexibility contract 
rather than distributing the total supply chain profit. The manufacturer can still 
guarantee a certain profit level to the retailer in exchange of charging a higher 
wholesale price. Finally, a combination of using both β and the wholesale price as 
parameters can also achieve the desired profit sharing mechanism.   
Table 7.3: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Wholesale Price as Profit Sharing Parameter 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.6 0.6 100 1,000 1,000 997 99,491 84,000 183,491 
0.6 0.6 105 1,000 1,000 997 94,491 89,000 183,491 
0.6 0.6 107 1,000 1,000 997 92,491 91,000 183,491 
0.6 0.6 108 1,000 1,000 997 91,491 92,000 183,491 
0.6 0.6 110 1,000 1,000 997 89,491 94,000 183,491 
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7.2 Committed Deliveries using Quantity Flexibility Contracts to Maximize 
Supply Chain Surplus with Demand as a Function of the Selling Price 
We have so far seen that commitment strategies where demand is a function of the 
selling price can improve retailer’s profit but are restricted with the Intracompany 
Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Company Profit View. The Intracompany 
Interfunctional scope leads to each stage of the supply chain trying to maximize its 
own profits, which does not necessarily result in the maximization of supply chain 
surplus. Supply chain surplus is maximized only when all supply chain stages 
coordinate strategy together. On the other hand, we have also seen that the 
Intercompany Interfunctional Scope: The Maximize Supply Chain Surplus View 
which requires that each company evaluate its actions in the context of the entire 
supply chain can be achieved using buyback or quantity flexibility contracts and 
profit sharing where demand is normally distributed, but not a function of the selling 
price. Therefore both methodologies are limited in their respective scopes. 
Combining both methodologies, we will now develop a model for committed 
deliveries using quantity flexibility contracts to maximize supply chain surplus with 
demand as a function of the selling price. 
As previously discussed, in quantity flexibility contracts, the manufacturer allows the 
retailer to change the quantity ordered after observing demand. If a retailer orders Q 
units, the manufacturer commits to providing Q+ = (1 + α)Q units, and the retailer is 
committed to buying at least Q- = (1 - β)Q units. Both α and β are between 0 and 1. 
Furthermore, let again v the unit production cost, c the unit wholesale price, p the 
unit selling price, s the retailer salvage value, and w the manufacturer salvage 
value. The manufacturer produces Q+ units and the retailer purchases Q- units if 
demand D is less than Q-, D units if demand D is between Q- and Q+, and Q+ units if 
demand D id greater than Q+ where the demand D is a function of the selling price 
with linear elasticity defined as: 
D = µ(p) = d(a – p) / b : a – b ≤ p ≤ a             (7.1) 
We also assume that demand is again normally distributed with a mean µ(p) and 
standard deviation σ(p). 
Substituting µ(p) and σ(p) into Equations (6.12) to (6.16), we obtain: 
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Expected quantity purchased by retailer: 
Q = Q- F(Q- ) + Q+ [1 - F(Q+ )] +  
µ(p) [ Fs[(Q+ - µ(p)) / σ(p)] - Fs[(Q- - µ(p)) / σ(p)]] - 
     σ(p) [ fs[(Q+ - µ(p)) / σ(p)] -  fs[(Q- - µ(p)) / σ(p)]]                   (7.2) 
Expected quantity sold by retailer: 
D = Q+ [1 - F(Q+ )]  + µ(p) Fs[(Q+ - µ(p)) / σ(p)] - σ(p) fs[(Q+ - µ(p)) / σ(p)]          (7.3) 
Expected overstock at manufacturer = Q – D             (7.4) 
Expected retailer profit = pD + s(Q – D) – cQ             (7.5)  
Expected manufacturer profit = cQ + w(Q+- Q) -vQ+              (7.6) 
Based on the same figures as in the previous examples, Tables 7.4 to 7.7, 
generated using Excel, show the impact of different quantity flexibility contracts on 
supply chain profitability where the demand is a function of the selling price. All 
contracts considered are such that the salvage value is nil at both the manufacturer 
and the retailer. 
Again, let each product costs v = $10 to produce, including transportation, and the 
manufacturer plans to charge a wholesale price c = $100 per unit. For consistency 
and comparison, we will also use the same linear elasticity function parameters, i.e., 
d = 1500, a = 300, b = 150, and for simplicity let σ(p) = 300 constant.  
Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 show the impact of selling price on the expected supply 
chain profit with α = β = 0.6 for a selling price range of $180 to $220.  
Since demand is now treated as a function of the selling price, by lowering the 
selling price, the supply chain can expect a higher demand and potentially higher 
expected supply chain profit. Although the retailer’s expected profit is maximized for 
a selling price of $200 when the wholesale price is $100 (as previously shown in 
Table 6.3), for the range of values considered, the supply chain’s surplus is 
maximized when the selling price is set to $180. The increase in expected sales 
(from 997 to 1,199) offsets the decrease in selling price (from $200 to $180) with a 
net increase of expected supply chain profit of approximately 7%.  
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Again profit sharing needs to be applied to convince the retailer to charge a lower 
price for the good of the entire supply chain.  
Table 7.4: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price 
α = β = 0.6 
α β 
Selling 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.6 0.6 180 1,200 1,200 1,199 95,853 100,800 196,653 
0.6 0.6 190 1,100 1,100 1,099 98,721 92,400 191,121 
0.6 0.6 200 1,000 1,000 997 99,491 84,000 183,491 
0.6 0.6 210 900 900 896 98,101 75,600 173,701 
0.6 0.6 220 800 800 793 94,466 67,200 161,666 
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It should be emphasized that the additional supply chain surplus thus generated is 
not attributable only to the inclusion of demand as a function of the selling price but 
also to the quantity flexibility contracts as well. As it can be seen from Table 7.5 and 
Figure 7.5, the supply chain surplus generated is lower for all selling prices without 
using a quantity flexibility contract. 
Table 7.5: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price 
α = β = 0 
α β 
Selling 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0 0 180 1,200 1,200 1,080 74,457 108,000 182,457 
0 0 190 1,100 1,100 980 76,260 99,000 175,260 
0 0 200 1,000 1,000 880 76,063 90,000 166,063 
0 0 210 900 900 780 73,867 81,000 154,867 
0 0 220 800 800 680 69,670 72,000 141,670 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Supply Chain  Profits with and without Contracts 
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For the selling price maximizing the total expected supply chain profit, quantity 
flexibility contracts can be further refined to increase the total supply chain surplus. 
This step is equivalent to using quantity flexibility contracts discussed in Section 6.6 
where demand is set for a given selling price. Table 7.6 and Figure 6.10 show that, 
for a selling price of $180, setting α = β = 0.4 maximizes the total expected supply 
chain profit.  
Table 7.6: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of Selling Price 
Selling Price = 180 
α β 
Selling 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0 0 180 1,200 1,200 1,080 74,457 108,000 182,457 
0.2 0.2 180 1,200 1,200 1,164 89,509 105,600 195,109 
0.4 0.4 180 1,200 1,200 1,193 94,745 103,200 197,945 
0.5 0.5 180 1,200 1,200 1,197 95,541 102,000 197,541 
0.6 0.6 180 1,200 1,200 1,199 95,853 100,800 196,653 
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It should be noted that the selection of α alone maximizes the expected supply 
chain profit since the expected quantity sold by retailer is a function of α and not β. 
As it can be seen in Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7, the expected supply chain profit is 
constant for α = 0.4 regardless the value of β. However, since the expected quantity 
purchased by retailer is a function of both α and β, we can move the unsold 
inventory from manufacturer to retailer by decreasing β while keeping α constant to 
guarantee the same total expected supply chain profit. 
Table 7.7: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price and 
Selling Price = 180  α = 0.4 
α β 
Selling 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.4 0.1 180 1,200 1,262 1,193 88,529 109,416 197,945 
0.4 0.2 180 1,200 1,229 1,193 91,836 106,109 197,945 
0.4 0.4 180 1,200 1,200 1,193 94,745 103,200 197,945 
0.4 0.6 180 1,200 1,194 1,193 95,361 102,584 197,945 
0.4 0.8 180 1,200 1,193 1,193 95,437 102,508 197,945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Supply Chain Profit
Selling Price = 180  α = 0.4
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In order to compensate the retailer’s profit decrease due to a lower selling price, 
hence a lower profit margin, profit sharing discussed in Section 6.7 needs to be 
applied. Table 7.8 and Figure 7.8 show the effect of using the wholesale price as 
profit sharing parameter. Decreasing the wholesale price the manufacturer charges 
the retailer from $100 to $96, thus increasing the retailer’s profit margin, will 
approximately evenly distribute the total supply chain profit.      
Table 7.8: Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price and 
Wholesale Price as Profit Sharing Parameter 
Selling Price = 180 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.4 0.4 95 1,200 1,200 1,193 100,745 97,200 197,945 
0.4 0.4 96 1,200 1,200 1,193 99,545 98,400 197,945 
0.4 0.4 97 1,200 1,200 1,193 98,345 99,600 197,945 
0.4 0.4 98 1,200 1,200 1,193 97,145 100,800 197,945 
0.4 0.4 100 1,200 1,200 1,193 94,745 103,200 197,945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7.8:   Manufacturer and Retailer Profits 
Selling Price = 180 and  α = β = 0.4  
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Finally, as we stated, a combination of using both β and the wholesale price as 
parameters can also achieve the desired profit sharing mechanism. Table 7.9 and 
Figure 7.9 show the effect of using β to further refine profit sharing.  
Table 7.9:  Order Sizes and Profits at the Manufacturer and the Retailer with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price and 
β as Profit Sharing Parameter 
Wholesale Price = 96 
α β 
Whole 
sale 
Price 
($) 
Order 
Size 
Expected 
Purchase 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Sale 
(Retailer) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Retailer) 
($) 
Expected 
Profit 
(Man.) 
($) 
Expected 
Supply 
Chain 
Profit 
($) 
0.4 0.1 96 1,200 1,262 1,193 93,578 104,367 197,945 
0.4 0.2 96 1,200 1,229 1,193 96,752 101,193 197,945 
0.4 0.3 96 1,200 1,210 1,193 98,599 99,346 197,945 
0.4 0.35 96 1,200 1,204 1,193 99,158 98,787 197,945 
0.4 0.4 96 1,200 1,200 1,193 99,545 98,400 197,945 
 
 
 
 
 
Excel calculations for Table 7.9 are given in Appendix A. 
Figure 7.9: Manufacturer and Retailer Profits
Selling Price = 180 and Wholesale Price = 96
90,000
95,000
100,000
105,000
110,000
0.10.20.30.4
β
Pr
o
fit
Manufacturer
Retailer
Pr
o
fit
  94 
7.3  Computer Program to Find Optimum Contract Parameters 
Calculations for Table 7.1 through Table 7.9 are carried out using Excel formulas for 
specific set of parameters. To simulate and calculate the optimum supply chain 
contract values for the entire system, we also developed a VBA (Visual Basic for 
Applications) computer program consisting of five procedures: 
• Simulate_p   to compute optimum selling price, 
• Simulate_alpha   to compute the optimum α value, 
• Simulate_p_alpha  to compute optimum selling price and α value simultaneously 
• Simulate_c   to compute profit sharing wholesale price, and  
• Simulate_beta   to compute profit sharing β value. 
VBA computer program source code of the procedures is given in Appendix B 
7.3.1 Simulate_p 
Figure 7.10 shows the screenshot output of Simulate_p to compute the optimum 
selling price for Table 7.4. For consistency and comparison, the selling price is 
restricted to a range of [180, 220] and α = β is set to 0.6. 
 
Figure 7.10: Screenshot from VBA program 
Simulate_p  (p [180, 200]) 
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Figure 7.11 is a rerun of the same procedure Simulate_p with unrestricted selling 
price. It should be noted that by removing the restriction, supply chain profit is now 
maximized at p = 158 with SCP = 201,608. Initial input screenshot for is also given 
for completeness.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Screenshot from VBA program  
Simulate_p (unrestricted p)  
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7.3.2 Simulate_alpha 
For the selling price maximizing the total supply chain profit, quantity flexibility 
contracts can be further refined by now setting α to its optimum value. Figure 7.12 
shows the screenshot output of Simulate_alpha to compute the optimum α value for 
Table 7.6. Again for consistency and comparison, the selling price is set to its 
optimum restricted value of 180.  
The granularity for α is chosen as 0.01 and β is set equal to α. It should be noted 
that β has no effect on the expected supply chain profit but merely redistributes the 
total supply chain surplus between the manufacturer and the retailer.  
 
Figure 7.12: Screenshot from VBA program  
Simulate_alpha 
Simulate_alpha needs to be run after Simulate_p using its optimum selling price. 
However, optimizing the selling price first and then the α value may only result to 
local maximums. Therefore, both the selling price and the α value need to be 
simulated simultaneously. This is achieved by running the procedure 
Simulate_p_alpha.  
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7.3.3 Simulate_p_alpha 
Figure 7.13 shows the screenshot output of simulate_p_alpha to compute the 
optimum selling price and the alpha value combination maximizing the supply chain 
profit with unrestricted selling price. 
 
Figure 7.13: Screenshot from VBA program  
Simulate_p_alpha 
7.3.4 Simulate_c and Simulate_beta 
Once a supply chain profit maximizing selling price and its corresponding optimum α 
value are computed, profit sharing can then be achieved by resetting the wholesale 
price and/or β value. Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15 show the screenshot output of the 
procedures simulate_c and simulate_beta to compute the profit sharing wholesale 
price and profit sharing β value corresponding to Table 7.8, and Table 7.9 
respectively. 
Again for consistency and comparison, the selling price is set to its optimum 
restricted value of 180.  
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Figure 7.14: Screenshot from VBA program  
Simulate_c 
 
 
Figure 7.15: Screenshot from VBA program  
Simulate_beta 
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7.4  Model Comparison 
Table 7.10 summarizes the strength and weaknesses of the models discussed and 
developed. 
Table 7.10: Strength and Weaknesses of the Models Discussed and Developed 
Existing Models Strength Weaknesses 
Maximize Retailer Profit 
without/with Commitment 
Opportunity   
(Demand as a Function of 
the Selling Price) 
• Correlates demand to 
selling price using 
elasticity demand 
functions 
• Restricted with the 
Intracompany Scope, 
does not maximize 
total supply chain 
profit 
• Deals with only one 
segment of the 
supply chain 
Maximize Supply Chain 
Profit with Buyback and 
Quantity Flexibility 
Contracts  
(Normally Distributed 
Demand) 
• Increases total supply 
chain surplus 
• Intercompany scope, 
coordinates all stages 
of the supply chain 
• Does not correlate 
demand to selling 
price, hence price 
insensitive 
• Does not address 
profit sharing 
• Buyback contracts do 
not include costs 
associated with 
returns 
• Quantity flexibility 
contracts do not 
differentiate salvage 
value in different 
segments of the 
supply chain  
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Table 7.10: (cont.) 
Proposed Models Strength Weaknesses 
Maximize Supply Chain 
Profit with Buyback and 
Quantity Flexibility 
Contracts and Profit 
Sharing  
(Normally Distributed 
Demand) 
• Increases total supply 
chain surplus 
• Intercompany scope, 
coordinates all stages 
of the supply chain 
• Addresses profit 
sharing 
• Does not correlate 
demand to selling 
price, hence price 
insensitive 
• Buyback contracts do 
not include costs 
associated with 
returns 
• Quantity flexibility 
contracts do not 
differentiate salvage 
value in different 
segments of the 
supply chain 
Maximize Supply Chain 
Profit with Buyback and 
Quantity Flexibility 
Contracts and Profit 
Sharing  
(Demand as a Function of 
the Selling Price) 
• Correlates demand to 
selling price using 
elasticity demand 
functions 
• Maximizes total 
supply chain surplus 
• Intercompany scope, 
coordinated all stages 
of the supply chain 
• Addresses profit 
sharing 
• Buyback contracts do 
not include costs 
associated with 
returns 
• Quantity flexibility 
contracts do not 
differentiate salvage 
value in different 
segments of the 
supply chain 
As it can be observed from Table 7.10, the model we developed, “Maximize Supply 
Chain Profit with Buyback and Quantity Flexibility Contracts and Profit Sharing with 
Demand as a Function of the Selling Price Model” combines the strength of the 
existing models and addresses their main weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEACH 
In this dissertation we have explored several models addressing the implications of 
supply chain contracts in supply chain networks. Our work has focused on the 
decisions jointly made by a manufacturer and a retailer to determine the optimal 
level of product availability. The central theme in these models has been the notion 
of contracts that specify the parameters within which a retailer places orders and a 
manufacturer fulfills them in order to maximize the total supply chain surplus. 
In Chapter 3, we looked at various supply chain stages, decision phases, cycles, 
and supply chain implementation with the objective of maximizing the overall value 
generated by the supply chain. In Chapter 4, we reviewed the supply chain 
performance in terms of a strategic fit to match supply chain’s responsiveness with 
demand uncertainty along with major demand patterns, and the need of an 
Intercompany Interfunctional scope to maximize total supply chain surplus. We also 
looked at various supply chain drivers to achieve the balance between efficiency 
and responsiveness, and obstacles to achieve this strategic fit. 
In Chapter 5, we reviewed the impact of information technology structure upon 
supply chain collaboration and how APS systems seek to integrate information and 
coordinate overall supply chain decisions. 
In Chapter 6, we discussed two supply chain contract models.  First, where a retailer 
facing price sensitive demand may obtain a discount by committing a fixed quantity 
over a finite horizon and second where a manufacturer offering buyback or quantity 
flexibility contracts may increase the total supply chain profit. We concluded that the 
first model incorporates demand as a function of the selling price but does not 
address the crucial issue of total supply chain surplus maximization. On the other 
hand, the second model, although it increases the total supply chain surplus, does 
not incorporate the demand elasticity.  
We then developed in Chapter 7 a model to address the individual weaknesses of 
the models discussed by incorporating the price sensitive demand into quantity 
flexible contracts by determining the optimal level of product availability, as a 
function of the selling price, which maximizes the total supply chain profit. We also 
  102 
proposed two solutions to the issue of profit sharing related to the additional supply 
chain profit. Furthermore, through numerical experiments, we showed that our 
model maximizes total supply chain surplus by incorporating demand elasticity and 
profit sharing. We also developed a computer program to help simulate the system 
to find optimum contract parameters. 
We then summarized the strength and weaknesses of the models discussed with 
respect to our model and showed that our model, Maximize Supply Chain Profit with 
Buyback and Quantity Flexibility Contracts and Profit Sharing with Demand as a 
Function of the Selling Price Model, combines the strength of the models discussed 
and addresses their main weaknesses. We strongly believe that the supply chain 
contract models developed in this dissertation can be an integral part of any APS 
system. 
8.1  Future Work 
The model presented here assumes that the supply chain consists of a 
manufacturer and a retailer. Future work should consider extending the supply chain 
to model suppliers and/or distributors as well.  
Furthermore, the model assumes that the product is at maturity phase of its life 
cycle with a normally distributed constant/horizontal demand pattern. Future work 
should consider different demand patterns at different phases of the product’s life 
cycle. 
Although the model developed addresses major weaknesses of the other models, it 
does not include the costs associated with returns in buyback contracts. It does not 
differentiate salvage value in different segments of the supply chain for quantity 
flexibility contracts either. Future work should also consider addressing these 
issues.  
For now, the integration of the supply chain contract models developed need to be 
implemented into APS software through customized development. The coordination 
through the supply chain can then be achieved by Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) processes. We sincerely believe and hope 
to see a supply chain contract module as an integral part of logistical information 
systems. 
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APPENDIX A.  EXCEL CALCULATIONS 
The following Excel functions are used to evaluate various normal distribution 
functions: 
F(x, µ, σ) = NORMDIST(x, µ, σ, 1) 
f(x, µ, σ) = NORMDIST(x, µ, σ, 0) 
The following Excel functions are used to evaluate various standard normal 
distribution functions: 
Fs(x) = NORMDIST(x, 0, 1, 1) or NORMSDIST(x) 
fs(x) = NORMDIST(x, 0, 1, 0) 
A.1 NORMDIST 
NORMDIST returns the normal distribution for the specified mean and standard 
deviation.  
Syntax: NORMDIST(x,mean,standard_dev,cumulative) 
X is the value for which the distribution is evaluated. 
Mean is the arithmetic mean of the distribution. 
Standard_dev is the standard deviation of the distribution. 
Cumulative is a logical value that determines the form of the function. If cumulative 
is TRUE or 1, NORMDIST returns the cumulative distribution function; if cumulative 
is FALSE or 0, it returns the probability mass function. 
If mean = 0, standard_dev = 1, and cumulative = TRUE, NORMDIST returns the 
standard normal distribution, NORMSDIST.  
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The equation (cumulative = FALSE) is:  
 
When cumulative = TRUE, the formula is the integral from negative infinity to x of 
the given formula. 
A.2 NORMSDIST 
NORMSDIST returns the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The 
distribution has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
Syntax: NORMSDIST(z) 
Z is the value for which the distribution is evaluated. 
The equation is:  
 
A.3 Excel Calculations for Table 7.8 
Excel calculations for Table 7.8 are shown in Figure A.1. 
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α β v c p Q Q+ Q-
Purchase 
Quantity by 
Retailer 
(PbyR)
Sold 
Quantity by 
Retailer 
(SbyR)
Retailer 
Profit      
(RP)
Manufac. 
Profit     
(MP)
Supply 
Chain Profit 
(SCP)
µ σ Fs(Q+) Fs(Q-) fs(Q+) fs(Q-)
param param param param param param formula formula formula formula formula formula formula param param formula formula formula formula
0.4 0.1 10 96 180 1,200 1,680 1,080 1,262 1,193 93,578 104,367 197,945 1,200 300 0.94520071 0.34457826 0.11092083 0.36827014
0.4 0.2 10 96 180 1,200 1,680 960 1,229 1,193 96,752 101,193 197,945 1,200 300 0.94520071 0.2118554 0.11092083 0.28969155
0.4 0.3 10 96 180 1,200 1,680 840 1,210 1,193 98,599 99,346 197,945 1,200 300 0.94520071 0.11506967 0.11092083 0.19418605
0.4 0.35 10 96 180 1,200 1,680 780 1,204 1,193 99,158 98,787 197,945 1,200 300 0.94520071 0.08075666 0.11092083 0.14972747
0.4 0.4 10 96 180 1,200 1,680 720 1,200 1,193 99,545 98,400 197,945 1,200 300 0.94520071 0.05479929 0.11092083 0.11092083
Q+ = (1 + α) * Q
G3 = (1 + A3) * F3
Q- = (1 - β) * Q
H3 = (1 - B3) * Q
Fs(Q+) = NORMSDIST(((Q+) - µ) / σ)
P3 = NORMSDIST((G3 - N3) / O3)
Fs(Q-) = NORMSDIST(((Q-) - µ) / σ )
Q3 = NORMSDIST((H3 - N3) / O3)
fs(Q+) = NORMDIST(((Q+) - µ) / σ, 0, 1, 0 )
R3 = NORMDIST((G3 - N3) / O3, 0, 1, 0)
fs(Q-) = NORMDIST(((Q-) - µ) / σ, 0, 1, 0 )
S3 = NORMDIST((H3 - N3) / O3, 0, 1, 0)
PbyR = (Q-) * NORMDIST((Q-), µ, σ, 1) + (Q+) * (1 - NORMDIST((Q+), µ, σ, 1)) + (µ * (Fs(Q+) - Fs(Q-))) - (σ * (fs(Q+) - fs(Q-)))
I3 = H3 * NORMDIST(H3, N3, O3, 1) + G3 * (1 - NORMDIST(G3, N3, O3,1)) + (N3 * (P3 - Q3)) - (O3 * (R3 - S3))
SbyR = (Q+) * (1 - NORMDIST((Q+), µ, σ, 1) + (µ * Fs(Q+)) - (σ * fs(Q+))
J3 = G3 * (1-NORMDIST(G3, N3, O3, 1)) + (N3 * P3) - (O3 * R3)
RP = (p * SbyR) - (c * PbyR)
K3 = (E3 * J3) - (D3 * I3)
MP = (c * PbyR) - (v * (Q+))
L3 = (D3 * I3) - (C3 * G3)
SCP = RP + MP
M3 = K3 + L3
Figure A.1:  Excel Formulas and Calculations for Table 7.8
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